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Ruminations on the Louisiana Law of Pledge 
Michael H. Rubin* 
On January 1, 2015, Act 281 of the 2014 Louisiana legislative 
session took effect.1 Drafted by the Louisiana State Law Institute,2 
the Act amends, revises, and reworks not only the Civil Code 
articles concerning the rules on pledge as a form of real security, but 
also the articles setting forth the basic principles of personal liability 
and security for loans. It also deals, in part, with judicial mortgages. 
Practitioners will find that, although many basic pledge concepts 
remain the same, there are a number of new rules, new procedures, 
and, in some cases, new prohibitions.  
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by MICHAEL H. RUBIN. 
 * Mr. Rubin is a member of the multi-state firm of McGlinchey Stafford. 
He has served as an Adjunct Professor at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center for 
more than three decades and is a past president of the American College of Real 
Estate Lawyers, the Bar Association of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and the Louisiana Bar Association. He is a Life Member of the 
American Law Institute, a Commissioner on the Uniform Law Commission, and 
was a member of the Louisiana State Law Institute Committee that proposed the 
2014 revision to the pledge articles. His latest legal book is LOUISIANA 
SECURITY DEVICES: A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis). His debut novel, published in the 
Fall of 2014, is the legal thriller, THE COTTONCREST CURSE, published by the 
LSU Press. 
The author extends his thanks to L. David Cromwell, Christopher Odinet, 
Dian Tooley-Knoblett, and Gabriel A. Crowson for their many helpful 
comments and suggestions about this Article and the examples contained in it. 
Their advice is sincerely appreciated, and any errors that remain are purely those 
of the author. 
 1. Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts. The Louisiana Law Review deviates from 
The Bluebook for Louisiana source material when citing to session laws in the 
Acts of the Louisiana Legislature. In addition to providing the year and page 
number for the particular session law, the Louisiana Law Review also provides 
the Act number. The Acts of the Louisiana Legislature can be found on 
HeinOnline (under “Session Laws Library”) or in the Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center Library.  
 2. The Louisiana State Law Institute was created by the Legislature in 
1938 and serves as “an official advisory law revision commission, law reform 
agency and legal research agency.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:201 (2007). Note, 
references to Louisiana Revised Statutes contained within are to the West 
Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated. The date appended to each statutory 
reference is the publication date of each section. See also Act No. 166, 1938 La. 
Acts 430. The Law Institute works not only on the “continuous revision, 
clarification and co-ordination of the Louisiana Revised Statutes,” but also on 
revisions to the Louisiana Civil Code. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:251 
(2007). 
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I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE LOUISIANA LAW OF PLEDGE 
There are numerous historical antecedents for the Louisiana 
law of pledge, including an Egyptian tradition of pledging a 
mummy to secure a loan,3 Greek4 and Roman5 law, and the Bible.6  
Although there is an ongoing scholarly debate about whether 
Louisiana owes more of its civilian tradition7 to France or Spain,8 
there is no dispute that, at the time the entire Civil Code was 
revised in 1870 following the Civil War,9 only 19 of its more than 
                                                                                                             
 3. See Valerie Seals Meiners, Comment, Formal Requirements Of Pledge 
Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 3158 and Related Articles, 48 LA. L. REV. 
129, 129 (1987). 
 4. See John H. Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal 
Ideas, 10 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322–23 (1897). This article notes that 
[I]n at least four important bodies of law and language the primitive 
word for the ideas of “pledge,” “bet” (or “forfeit”), and “promise,” was 
substantially the same. In the Scandinavian we have vaed, ved. In the 
Germanic we have wetti, wette, wedde, vadi-um, guadi-um, and (by 
sliding the di into ji) wage, guage, gage. In the Latin we have pignus in 
the first two meanings, and from the same root (Πηγ́νυμι) pango, pag, 
pactum, in the third meaning. In the Greek, the verb-stem øϵτ (put) has 
all three meanings.  
Id. (citations omitted). See also John H. Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in 
Comparative Legal Ideas. III, 11 HARV. L. REV. 18 (1897). 
 5. See Donald E. Phillipson, Development of the Roman Law of Debt 
Security, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1230, 1237 (1968) (“Although pignus had apparently 
arisen before the fifth century B.C., it was not included in the Twelve Tables. 
Pignus was a form of security far less formal and restrictive than fiducia cum 
creditore, because it did not involve a transfer of civil ownership.”); Cf. Shael 
Herman, The Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of Antebellum 
Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 257 (1995). 
 6. See, e.g., Genesis 38:18 (The Soncino Chumash) (“And he said, ‘What 
pledge shall I give thee?’ And she said, ‘Thy signet, and thy bracelets, and thy 
staff that is in thy hand.’”); Deuteronomy 24:6 (The Soncino Chumash) (“No 
man shall take the mill or the upper millstone to pledge, for he taketh a man’s 
life to pledge.”). 
 7. For a discussion of Louisiana’s civilian tradition, see Alvin B. Rubin, 
Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in a Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the 
Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. REV. 1369 (1988). 
 8. See Vernon V. Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish 
Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French 
Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067 (2003); see also Alain 
Levasseur & Vicenç Feliú, The English Fox in the Louisiana Civil Law 
Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English Language; Comparativists 
Beware!, 69 LA. L. REV. 715 (2009). 
 9. For an overview of the revisions to the Civil Code, see A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, in LA. CIVIL CODE, at XLI (Vol. 1 
2014). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see A.N. Yiannopoulos, Two 
Critical Years in the Life of the Louisiana Civil Code: 1870 and 1913, 53 LA. L. 
REV. 5 (1992) [Yiannopoulos, Two Critical Years]. 
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40 articles on pledge were either direct translations of provisions of 
the Code Napoléon or dealt with the same subject matter.10 
Nonetheless, because the previous Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 
was written in both French and English (with French being the 
original language and English being the translation),11 and because 
French law at the time influenced the redactors of the 1825 Civil 
Code,12 many Louisiana courts have looked to the works of French 
commentators to aid in understanding the pledge provisions.13 
Once the 1870 Civil Code articles on pledge were enacted, they 
remained almost completely unchanged until the 2014 legislative 
session.14  
                                                                                                             
 10. See LA. STATE LAW INST., 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES: COMPILED 
EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA, pt. 2 (1942) (containing a word-
for-word comparison of the 1804 Code Napoleon, and the Louisiana Civil Codes 
of 1808, 1825, and 1870). The following 1870 Civil Code articles are the subject 
of Act 281 and are traceable directly back to the Code Napoleon: 3133–3135, 
3141, 3157, 3160, 3162, 3164–3167, 3169, 3171, and 3176–3181. 
 11. Id.  
 12. See Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, supra note 9, at 
XLVII, XLIX (“The redactors of the 1825 Code followed the French Civil Code 
closely and relied heavily on French doctrine and jurisprudence. . . . The 1808 
and 1825 Louisiana Civil Codes were drawn up in French and translated into 
English. . . . [C]ourts taking cognizance of the fact that the French text was the 
original version, and being aware of the poor quality of the [English] translation, 
developed the view that the French text was controlling.”); see also 
Yiannopoulos, Two Critical Years, supra note 9, at 22. 
 13. See, e.g., Scott v. Corkern, 91 So. 2d 569, 573 n.4 (La. 1956) (“The 
reason for this rule is founded on the writings of the French commentators, 
particularly Marcade, Troplong and Duranton who voice the opinion that it is 
not the contract of pledge that interrupts prescription but the continuous 
possession of the thing pledged with the debtor’s consent to such possession that 
serves as a constant acknowledgment of the debt.” (citation omitted)); see also 
Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467, 484 (1877); Citizens’ Bank v. Janin, 15 So. 471, 
473 (La. 1894) (citing Troplong and Dalloz).  
 14. Of the 48 articles on pledge contained in the 1870 Civil Code (articles 
3133–3181), 42 remained unchanged until the 2014 legislation. Two of the 1870 
articles were repealed (articles 3160 and 3161). Four other articles were 
amended between 1870 and 2014. The first is article 3133.1, amended by Act 
No. 137, § 16, 1989 La. Acts 527, effective September 1, 1989, and Act No. 
1079, §7, 1990 La. Acts 2735, effective September 1, 1990, to deal with 
Louisiana’s adoption of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 10:9-101, 
Louisiana’s version of UCC article 9. The second is article 3158, amended by 
Act No. 157, § 1, 1900 La. Acts 239, Act No. 290, § 1, 1952 La. Acts 489, and 
Act No. 137, § 17, 1989 La. Acts 527, which had the effect of reworking the 
statute concerning the requirements of the pledge of movables and the effects of 
pledge on third parties. Third, article 3159, amended by Act No. 157, §2, 1900 
La. Acts 239 dealt with pledges in favor of banks and last, article 3165, 
amended by Act No. 9, 1872 La. Acts 36, concerning the rights of a pledgee 
upon the debtor’s default. See Ralph Slovenko, Of Pledge, 33 TUL. L. REV. 59 
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When Louisiana adopted its version of UCC 9 in 1990,15 many 
of the security interests that previously had been controlled by the 
Civil Code pledge articles were superseded by the UCC provisions. 
The 1870 Civil Code pledge articles remained in effect, however, 
because there were some real security assets not covered by 
Louisiana’s version of UCC 9.16  
In the quarter of a century since Louisiana adopted UCC 9, 
there has evolved a need to revisit the Civil Code pledge articles. 
The Legislature enacted the Louisiana State Law Institute’s draft 
proposal in its entirety,17 and the current revision to the pledge 
articles completely rewrites this section of the Civil Code.  
Some of the changes made by the 2014 legislation alter prior 
law and introduce new concepts. For example, Act 281 of 2014 
allows non-recourse loans secured by a pledge.18 It abolishes 
                                                                                                             
 
(1959) (discussing the pledge rules adopted in 1870 and the jurisprudence that 
developed in the more than sixty years that followed). 
 15. Although technically the proper terminology should be “Chapter 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 10:9-101 et seq.,” for ease 
of reference this article will use the phrase “UCC 9.” 
 16. For simplicity, this Rumination refers to the Louisiana Civil Code in a 
modified fashion, to highlight the differences between the old and new 
provisions, which became effective January 1, 2015. The term “Old C.C. art. 
(2013) (repealed 2014)” will be used to refer to those Civil Code provisions 
impacted by Act 281 as they existed prior to January 1, 2015, the effective date 
of Act 281. The term “New C.C. art. (2015)” will be used to refer to the Civil 
Code provisions as amended by Act 281. See Old C.C. art. 3133.1 (2013) 
(repealed 2014) (amended by Act No. 137, 1989 La. Acts 527 & Act No. 1079, 
1990 La. Acts 2811).  
This Title shall apply to pledges of movables that are delivered prior to 
the time Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws becomes 
effective, including without limitation those pledges that may secure 
future obligations and lines of credit, as well as to pledges entered into 
on or after the time Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws 
becomes effective that are exempt or otherwise excluded from coverage 
thereunder.  
Old C.C. art. 3133.1 (2013) (repealed 2014). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
10:9-109(d) (2002) (detailing the types of transactions that are outside the scope 
of Louisiana’s version of UCC 9). 
 17. L. David Cromwell served as Reporter for the Law Institute’s Security 
Devices Committee and Claire Popovich was the staff attorney. Members of the 
Committee included: James R. Austin, David J. Boneno, Elizabeth R. Carter, 
Scott P. Gallinghouse, David W. Gruning, Thomas A. Harrell, Kelly G. Juneau, 
Peter L. Koerber, Marilyn C. Maloney, Max Nathan, Jr., Christopher Odinet, 
Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Emmett C. Sole, James A. Stuckey, Adam J. Swensek, 
Susan G. Talley, George J. Tate, Robert P. Thibeaux, Dian Tooley-Knoblett, 
Keith Vetter, and Michael H. Rubin.  
 18. See New C.C. art. 3135 (2015).  
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antichresis, which is the pledge of immovable property.19 It alters 
the rules on how a creditor can obtain a secured position in a 
landlord’s lease or rents as well as the rules regulating the rights of 
landlord, creditor, and tenant, and it moves these rules from the 
Revised Statutes to the Civil Code.20 It affirms the enforceability 
of a “negative pledge” but prohibits a payment obligor from 
restricting the right of the payment obligee to encumber the 
payment stream.21  
For the remainder of this Rumination, the term “Old C.C. art.” 
will be used to refer to those Civil Code provisions impacted by Act 
281 as they existed prior to January 1, 2015, the effective date of 
Act 281. The term “New C.C. art.” will be used to refer to the Civil 
Code provisions as amended by Act 281.22 
II. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL LIABILITY, PERSONAL 
SECURITY, AND REAL SECURITY 
Act 281 did more than amend and change the Civil Code’s pledge 
provisions. It also reworked articles that had been in the “privileges” 
section of the Civil Code setting forth the general principles of 
personal liability, personal security, and real security.23 
A. An Obligor’s Personal Liability and Creditor Remedies  
Old C.C. arts. 3182 and 3183 have long been considered the 
starting point for any analysis of security interests. Old C.C. art. 
3182 declared that once one had bound “himself personally,” his 
personal obligation was to be satisfied out of all of his “property, 
movable and immovable, present and future.”24 New C.C. art. 3133 
adopts the same rule, and the Comments to the article note that this 
general provision is subject to state statutory and state 
constitutional exemptions from seizure. 
Old C.C. art. 3183 declared that the property of a debtor “is the 
common pledge of his creditors and the proceeds of its sale must 
be distributed among them ratably, unless there exist among the 
creditors some lawful causes of preference.”25 When the Civil 
Code was revised in 1870 following the Civil War, the only lawful 
                                                                                                             
 19. See Old C.C. arts. 3176–3181 (2013) (repealed 2014). 
 20. See infra Part IX. 
 21. See infra Part VII. 
 22. See supra note 16. 
 23. Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts. 
 24. See Old C.C. art. 3182 (2013) (repealed 2014). 
 25. See Old C.C. art. 3183 (2013) (repealed 2014). 
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causes of preference were privileges and mortgages.26 New C.C. 
art. 3134 employs the same general concept as Old C.C. art. 3183 
but notes that the ratable sale rule is subject to “a preference 
authorized or established by legislation.”27  
The Comments to new C.C. art. 3134 point out that not all of 
an obligor’s creditors are entitled to an “immediate right to share in 
the proceeds of each sale of the obligor’s property,” noting, for 
example, that in a voluntary sale, the obligor retains the proceeds, 
but these then form part of the obligor’s patrimony that creditors 
can pursue.  
B. Contractual Limitations on What Property a Creditor May Seize 
Louisiana law creates constitutional and statutory exemptions 
from seizure and sale,28 but nothing in Louisiana law has 
prohibited parties from contracting for additional limitations. 
Further, since 1992 the Civil Code has permitted non-recourse 
mortgages—mortgages in which the obligor has no personal 
liability on the principal obligation that the mortgage secures and 
where the creditor’s only right to collect funds is through a seizure 
and sale of the mortgaged property.29 
Until Act 281 was adopted, the Civil Code had never expressly 
dealt with the converse of this rule—the possibility of a personal 
obligation where the creditor agrees to limit recovery to only 
“particular property or to a specified class of property.”30 New 
C.C. art. 3135 expressly authorizes this type of contractual 
provision.31 
                                                                                                             
 26. See Old C.C. art. 3184 (2013) (repealed 2014). 
 27. See New C.C. art. 3134 (2015). 
 28. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. 12, § 9 (1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881 
(2006). 
 29. Old C.C. art. 3297 (2013) (repealed 2014) (amended by Act No. 652, 
1991 La. Acts 302). Prior to the adoption of this article, debtors and creditors 
often created a non-recourse mortgage contractually. They would put a clause in 
the mortgage requiring the creditor, prior to suing the debtor personally, to 
foreclose on the mortgage by executory process without appraisal. Once a 
foreclosure without appraisal occurred, the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act 
prohibited the creditor from pursuing the debtor personally if the proceeds of the 
sale were not sufficient to satisfy the obligation. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
13:4106–4108.3 (2006). Thus, the parties were able to contractually create a 
mortgage package where the debtor effectively had no personal liability on the 
principal obligation secured by the mortgage.  
 30. New C.C. art. 3135 (2015). 
 31. In Shell Offshore, Inc. v. M.H. Marr, 916 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1990), the 
Fifth Circuit reversed “the district court’s determination that a provision in the 
subject agreement to the effect that Marr’s indebtedness to Shell ‘shall be paid’ 
from a share of Marr’s working interest in certain gas wells constitutes an 
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The language of New C.C. art. 3135 appears to permit contract 
provisions to trump a creditor’s right to obtain a judicial mortgage32 
on all of a debtor’s current and future property following a judgment 
and to obtain a writ of fieri facias33 on all of the judgment-debtor’s 
non-exempt property. Under New C.C. art. 3135, a debtor may have 
a basis to assert that, despite having lost a lawsuit concerning a debt 
and despite the creditor having obtained a judicial mortgage 
through the proper procedures,34 the specific provisions of a 
creditor’s contract with the judgment debtor prohibit the creditor 
from exercising the judicial mortgage on immovable property 
described in the contract or from obtaining a writ of fieri facias on 
other assets described in the contract. 
It is anticipated that jurisprudence will develop on the 
interpretation of the contractual limitations permitted by New C.C. 
art. 3135.  
C. What Is “Security” 
Although the UCC uses the term “security interest,”35 and 
although courses in Louisiana law schools that teach privileges, 
pledge, suretyship, and mortgage are called “Security Devices,” the 
term “security” had not been defined in the Civil Code until the 
2014 amendments.  
New C.C. art. 3136 defines security as “an accessory right 
established by legislation or contract” as well as “an obligation 
undertaken by a person other than the principal obligor.”36 Thus, 
the definition includes privileges as well as such concepts as 
pledge, mortgage, and suretyship, but the list given is only 
illustrative.37 The amendments, however, state that a Civil Code 
                                                                                                             
 
exclusive method for extinguishing the balance of that debt.” Id. at 1041. To the 
extent that Shell Offshore might be seen as granting credence to an assertion that 
one cannot limit recovery to certain assets absent a security interest in those 
assets, it appears that the 2014 amendment to article 3135 overrules this 
contention.  
 32. A judicial mortgage arises by operation of law from a judgment 
recorded in the parish mortgage records. See C.C. art. 3300 (2015). It is a 
general mortgage over all of the judgment debtor’s current and future owned 
immovable property in that parish. C.C. arts. 3302–3303 (2015). 
 33. Writs of fieri facias are dealt with in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 
articles 2292–2299. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 2292–2299 (2015). 
 34. See C.C. arts. 3285, 3299–3306 (2015). For more discussion on judicial 
mortgages, see infra Part X.  
 35. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-201(35) (2003). 
 36. See New C.C. art. 3136 (2015). 
 37. New C.C. art. 3138, Comment (c), provides:  
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“security” is not the same as a UCC security interest.38 To help 
avoid problems in the future, and because “it remains a common 
practice”39 for UCC 9 security interests to be “styled as a 
‘pledge,’”40 the 2014 amendments make it clear that calling a UCC 
9 security interest a “pledge” does not subject it to the provisions 
of the Civil Code pledge articles, but nonetheless the document 
“may be effective to create a [UCC 9] security interest in the 
thing.”41 
New C.C. art. 3137 defines personal and real security. The 
quintessential personal security is suretyship.42 The specific rules 
concerning the “real security” of pledge, mortgage, and privilege 
are governed by the appropriate sections and articles of the Civil 
Code and Revised Statutes.  
                                                                                                             
 
The list contained in this Article is merely illustrative. Other forms of 
security exist, such as a pignorative contract in the form of a sale with a 
right of redemption in favor of a seller who remains in possession.  
New C.C. art. 3138 (2015) (citations omitted).  
 38. See New C.C. art. 3139 (2015). 
 39. New C.C. art. 3143 cmt. (2015). For example, since its effective date in 
1990, UCC 9 has governed the perfection of a security interest in a collateral 
mortgage note. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-310(b)(6), 10:9-313(a) (Supp. 
2015); see also id. § 9:5551 (2007). Despite the fact that the old Civil Code 
pledge articles do not control post-1990 “pledges” of collateral mortgage notes, 
some courts continue to cite the old pledge articles, apparently assuming that 
they still apply to post-1990 collateral mortgage notes. See Old C.C. art. 3133.1 
(2013) (repealed 2014); see also supra note 16 (quoting old article 3133.1); see, 
e.g., CadleRock Joint Ventures Co. v. J. Graves Scaffolding Co., 152 So. 3d 
1079 (La. Ct. App. 2014).  
 40. New C.C. art. 3143 cmt. (2015). 
 41. Id. Note that the bracketed “UCC 9” does not appear in the text of New 
C.C. art. 3143 because New C.C. art. 3139 makes it clear that the term “security 
interest” refers to UCC 9. Nonetheless, the bracketed language has been added 
in the text above for emphasis. 
 42. The Comments to revised article 3137 note that this article “is new but it 
is not intended to change the law.” See New C.C. art. 3137 cmt. a (2015) (citing 
Slovenko, supra note 14). For more on suretyship, see Michael H. Rubin, 
Ruminations on Suretyship, 57 LA. L. REV. 565 (1997); MICHAEL H. RUBIN, 
LOUISIANA SECURITY DEVICES, A PRÉCIS, ch. 2–8 (LexisNexis 2011) 
[hereinafter RUBIN, A PRÉCIS]. It is possible that Louisiana law may contain 
personal security other than suretyship. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802 
cmt. b (Supp. 2015) (located in the Louisiana Private Works Act). Section 
9:4802 cmt. b states: 
Although the personal liability imposed upon the owner and the 
personal liability imposed upon the contractor are not those of sureties 
the claims are clearly obligations of security and are accessory to the 
primary contractual obligations of the claimants. 
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D. No Ownership by the Creditor upon Default 
New C.C. art. 3140 enshrines “a longstanding civilian 
concept”43 prohibiting contracts that permit a creditor to become 
the owner of the real security upon the debtor’s default. This rule, 
which has existed “since the edict of Constantine,”44 is designed to 
prevent creditors from inserting this clause into every contract, 
thereby allowing a creditor to get a windfall if the value of the real 
security far exceeds the debt, either at the time the debt is incurred 
or at the time a default occurs.  
Although New C.C. art. 3140 prohibits such pre-default 
agreements, nothing prevents a creditor and debtor, after default, 
from entering into a contract by which the debtor transfers an asset, 
including real security, to pay off all or a portion of a debt. This type 
of post-default contract is permitted both by the Civil Code’s 
“giving in payment” provisions45 as well as by the Deficiency 
Judgment Act.46 
                                                                                                             
 43. See New C.C. art. 3140 cmt. a (2015). 
 44. Alcolea v. Smith, 90 So. 769, 771 (1922). The quotation from the case 
is powerful and is worth reiterating in full: 
Since the edict of Constantine annulling and prohibiting what was 
known as the lex commissoria and the stipulation in the contract of 
pledge which it authorized, whereby, in default of payment by the 
pledgor, the thing pledged became the property of the pledgee without 
further action on his part, such stipulations have been prohibited in all 
countries where the civil law prevails, and the prohibition has long 
since become part of the common law, the commentators on both 
systems agreeing that they are contra bonos mores and oppressive; that 
they involve the abuse of the power of the strong over the weak, 
represent odious speculations by those who have money, at the expense 
of those who need it, and are unconscionable.  
Id. at 771 (citations omitted). 
 45. See Old C.C. arts. 2655–2659 (2013) (repealed 2014) (amended by Act 
No. 841, § 1, 1933 La. Acts 1037). This concept is often referred to in Louisiana 
as a dation en paiement. See, e.g., Succession of Dupre, 51 So. 2d 317, 318 (La. 
1950) (“A giving in payment or dation en paiement is an act by which a debitor 
gives a thing to a creditor, who is willing to receive it, in payment of a sum 
which is due.”); Farmers-Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. CIT Group/Equipment 
Fin., Inc., 888 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1989).  
 46. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4108.1–13:4108.3 (2006). For example, 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:4108.1(A) provides:  
As an exception to R.S. 13:4106 and 4107, if a mortgagee or other 
creditor holds a mortgage, pledge, security interest, or privilege which 
secures an obligation in a commercial transaction, the mortgagee or 
other creditor may collect from or pursue any debtor, guarantor, or 
surety for a deficiency judgment on the secured obligation whether or 
not the mortgagee or other creditor has foreclosed on all or any of the 
property and sold such property at a judicial, public, or private sale, 
with or without appraisal, regardless of the minimum bid, and whether 
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III. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF ASSETS THAT CAN BE PLEDGED 
Prior to 1990, the Civil Code pledge provisions were extremely 
broad and applied to “every corporeal thing, which is susceptible 
of alienation,”47 items classified as “incorporeal movables,”48 and 
“a claim on another person.”49 With the advent of Louisiana’s 
adoption of UCC 9 in 1990, however, creditors who wanted to 
secure loans with the vast majority of items that formerly could be 
pledged had to employ the UCC’s rules and procedures.50  
The changes made by Act 281 of 2014 include an exclusive 
listing of assets subject to pledge. Under New C.C. art. 3142, the 
“only things” that can be pledged are movables “not susceptible of 
encumbrance by security interest,” a “lessor’s rights in the lease of 
an immovable and its rents,”51 and “things made susceptible of 
pledge by law.”  
Among the things “made susceptible of pledge by law” are 
property insurance on immovables52 and certain mineral payments.53 
A. A Pledge of Property Insurance on Immovables 
The 2014 amendments changed portions of the Civil Code 
Ancillaries54 to make it clear that a pledge is the proper mechanism 
                                                                                                             
 
or not the mortgagee or other creditor has acquired such property from 
any debtor, guarantor, or surety pursuant to a complete or partial giving 
in payment. However, other than with regard to a secured transaction 
subject to Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws, a mortgagee 
or other creditor may not pursue any debtor, guarantor, or surety for 
more than the secured obligation, minus the reasonably equivalent 
value of the property sold.  
Id. § 13:4801.1 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 47. Old C.C. art. 3154 (2013) (repealed 2014).  
 48. Old C.C. art. 3155 (2013) (repealed 2014).  
 49. Old C.C. art. 3156 (2013) (repealed 2014). 
 50. Old C.C. art. 3133.1 (2013) (repealed 2014); see supra note 16 (quoting 
old article 3133.1 in full). 
 51. See infra Part IX (concerning a lessor’s encumbering the rental income 
stream of immovable property). 
 52. See infra Part III.A. 
 53. See infra Part III.B. 
 54. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Se. Health Care, 950 F.2d 944, 952–53 
(5th Cir. 1991) (“Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 contains the 
so-called Civil Code Ancillaries, particular statutes that supplement the Code.”); 
see also Guillory Real Estate, Inc. v. Ward, 296 So. 2d 853, 858 (La. Ct. App. 
1974) (“[T]he whole of Revised Statutes Title 9 which are known as the Civil 
Code Ancilliaries [sic], and are auxilliary [sic] to the Civil Code.”). When the 
Louisiana State Law Institute drafted the bill that became Louisiana Revised 
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to grant a mortgage creditor a real security right in insurance on 
immovable property.55 Thus, property insurance is one of the 
assets New C.C. art. 3142 makes “susceptible of pledge by law.” 
B. A Pledge of Mineral Payments by an Owner of Land or a 
Holder of a Mineral Servitude 
New C.C. art. 3172 clarifies the law on how to encumber 
mineral lease bonus payments payable to a landowner or holder of a 
mineral servitude. This article specifies the only kind of mineral 
payments susceptible of pledge. These are pledges by “the owner of 
land or holder of a mineral servitude” on “bonuses, delay rentals, 
royalties, and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases, as well 
as other payments that are classified as rent under the Mineral 
Code.”56  
The contract of pledge must specifically describe the mineral 
interests being pledged. As the Comments to this article note, a 
“mere statement that all leases and rents of the immovable are 
pledged will not suffice for the pledge to encumber mineral 
payments.”57  
Note that New C.C. art. 3172 does not apply to mineral 
payments owing to those who are neither a landowner nor a holder 
of a mineral servitude.58 
IV. THE ACCESSORY NATURE OF PLEDGE 
It has been a basic civil law principle that security is an 
accessory obligation.59 There must always be a principal obligation, 
even if that principal obligation is non-recourse.60  
                                                                                                             
 
Statutes section 9, it anticipated that these provisions would be called the 
“ancillaries.” See Harriet Daggett, 1950 Comments, reprinted in 2B WEST’S 
LSA REVISED STATUTES 3 (West): 
As indicated by the word Ancillaries, Title 9 of the Revised Statutes of 
1950 is auxiliary to the Civil Code of Louisiana. All of the sections are 
correlated with the books and titles of the Code and hence are very 
easily followed in pursuing a problem basically dependent upon the 
articles of the Code. . . . 
 55. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5386 (2007).  
 56. The Louisiana Mineral Code is Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 
31:1–31:217. 
 57. New C.C. art. 3172 cmt. b (2015).  
 58. See New C.C. art. 3172 cmt. f (2015) (“Mineral payments owing to a 
person other than a landowner or holder of a mineral servitude are not 
susceptible of pledge under this Title.”). 
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Unlike the laws of some states,61 in Louisiana the accessory 
obligation is not severable from the principal obligation. If the 
principal obligation becomes unenforceable, the accessory obligation 
is likewise unenforceable unless novation is involved.62 The converse, 
however, is not true. The extinguishment of an accessory obligation 
does not necessarily impact the enforceability of the principal 
obligation.63 
The principal obligation that a pledge secures may be for the 
performance of an act,64 for a debt of the pledgor, or for the debt of 
another.65 When the debt of a third party is secured by a pledge, 
the 2014 amendments to New C.C. art. 3148 adopt a rule 
applicable to suretyship66 and similar to a rule applicable to 
                                                                                                             
 
 59. The 2014 version of article 3136 described pledge as an “auxiliary 
obligation.” Article 3278 states that mortgages “secure the performance of an 
obligation,” and article 3282 states that “mortgage is accessory to the obligation 
it secures.” C.C. arts. 3278, 3282 (2015). See, e.g., Chapman v. Citizens’ Bank 
of La., 31 La. Ann. 395, 396 (1879): 
The mortgage, whether conventional or judicial, is but an accessory 
right, which can not [sic] exist without the principal right or obligation 
which it secures; and it is elementary in our law that the mortgage falls 
with the principal obligation to which it is accessory.  
 60. See supra note 29 (discussing non-recourse loans); Old C.C. art. 3135 
(2013) (repealed 2014). 
 61. See, e.g., Wiley v. Deutsch Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 539 F. App’x 533, 536 
(5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
Texas courts have explained on multiple occasions that a note and a 
deed of trust constitute separate actions. “It is so well settled as not to 
be controverted that the right to recover a personal judgment for a debt 
secured by a lien on land and the right to have a foreclosure of lien are 
severable, and a plaintiff may elect to seek a personal judgment without 
foreclosing the lien, and even without a waiver of the lien.” Where a 
debt is “secured by a note, which is, in turn, secured by a lien, the note 
and lien constitute separate obligations.” The duality of the lien and the 
note means that the beneficiary of the lien can be different from the 
holder of the note. 
 62. See, e.g., Tex. Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 667, 671 n.4 
(La. 1984) (“Pledge is an accessory contract . . . .”); Auguste v. Renard, 3 Rob. 
389, 390 (La. 1843) (“It is clear that a mortgage can exist only as an accessory 
to a principal obligation . . . .”). There are special rules on novation. Security for 
a novated obligation, “with the agreement of the parties,” may be transferred to 
a new obligation. See C.C. art. 1884 (2015). 
 63. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 1891, release of real security “does 
not give rise to a presumption of remission of debt.” There are special rules, 
however, for remission involving sureties. See C.C. art. 1892 (2015); see also 
Rubin, supra note 42, at 583–86; RUBIN, A PRÉCIS, supra note 42, at 45–47. 
 64. See New C.C. art. 3147 (2015). 
 65. See New C.C. art. 3148 (2015).  
 66. See C.C. art. 3046 (2015) (entitled “Defenses available to surety”). 
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mortgages.67 Under New C.C. art. 3148, the pledgor “may assert 
against the pledgee any defense that the obligor could assert except 
lack of capacity or discharge in bankruptcy of the obligor”68 or any 
“other defenses available to a surety.”69  
V. MAKING A PLEDGE EFFECTIVE BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
AND AS TO THIRD PARTIES 
The 2014 amendments made several important changes in the 
procedure by which pledges become effective between the parties 
and affect third parties. 
A. The Pledge of Corporeal Movables 
In contrast to the lengthy provisions of Old C.C. art. 3158,70 
there are now but three simple rules for the pledge of corporeal 
movables.  
First, all that is needed for a pledge of corporeal movables to 
be effective between the parties is the pledgor’s delivery of the 
object to either the pledgee or to “a third person who has agreed to 
hold the thing for the benefit of the pledgee.”71 Although no 
written agreement is required between the parties in such 
instances,72 there may need to be some type of agreement that the 
purpose of delivery is a pledge to secure a principal obligation, for 
there are other contracts that arise in connection with a delivery of 
corporeal movables from an owner to another, including loan for 
use,73 loan for consumption,74 and deposit.75  
                                                                                                             
 67. See C.C. art. 3295 (2015) (entitled “Mortgage securing another’s 
obligation”); C.C. art. 3296 (2015) (entitled “Right of mortgagor to raise 
defenses”).” 
 68. New C.C. art. 3148 (2015). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Old C.C. art. 3158 (2013) (repealed 2014) (amended by Act No. 157, 
§1, 1900 La. Acts 239–40; Act No. 290, §1, 1952 La. Acts 748–50; Act No. 
137, 1989 La. Acts 527, 589–92). This article, as amended through 1989, 
consisted of 985 words with six parts and ten subparts. 
 71. New C.C. art. 3149 (2015). 
 72. Note, however, that as Comment (e) to revised article 3149 cautions, if 
delivery of the corporeal movable is to someone other than either the pledgee or 
“a third person who has agreed to hold the thing for the benefit of the pledgee,” 
then even as between the parties a written agreement is required to make 
effective the pledge of the corporeal movable. For example, apparently a written 
agreement would be required even as between the parties if the delivery of the 
corporeal movable was to someone other than the pledgee who, at the time of 
the delivery, had not yet agreed to “hold the thing for the benefit of the 
pledgee.” New C.C. art. 3149 cmt. e (2015). 
 73. See C.C. arts. 2891–2903 (2015). 
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Second, making the pledge of corporeal movables effective to 
third parties requires a written contract in addition to the delivery 
requirement.76 There is no requirement that the written contract be 
notarized, witnessed, or recorded in any public record. 
Third, only the pledgee need sign the written contract. The 
pledgor’s acceptance “is presumed”77 and “may be tacit.”78  
The apparent simplicity of the rules involving corporeal 
movables masks a deeper issue. As the Comments to New C.C. art. 
3149 note, “there may actually be no corporeal movables to which 
[this] rule would presently apply, for Chapter 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code may cover all corporeal movables without 
exception.”79 As explained by the Comment this provision “is not 
intended to apply to a corporeal movable that is susceptible of 
encumbrance” under UCC 9. Therefore, the rules concerning 
corporeal movables only apply to those that now or in the future 
may be outside the scope of UCC 9.80 
B. The Pledge of Things that Are Not Corporeal Movables and Do 
Not Involve a Landlord’s Right in a Lease or Rental Income 
Under the 2014 revisions, a written instrument is the only way 
to pledge items that are not corporeal movables81 and that do not 
involve a landlord’s rights in a lease or rental income arising from 
immovable property.82 The written instrument is required to make 
such a pledge effective both between the parties83 and to third 
parties.84 No delivery is required, and the former distinction 
between “incorporeals evidenced in writing” and “incorporeals not 
evidenced in writing” has not been applicable since July 1, 2001.85 
                                                                                                             
 
 74. See C.C. arts. 2904–2912 (2015). 
 75. See C.C. arts. 2926–2940 (2015). 
 76. See New C.C. art. 3153 (2015). 
 77. New C.C. art. 3150 (2015). 
 78. Id. 
 79. New C.C. art. 3149 cmt. c (2015). 
 80. Id. 
 81. New C.C. art. 3149 (2015). 
 82. The special rules concerning landlords are located in Chapter 2 of the 
Pledge provisions. See generally New C.C. arts. 3168–3175 (2015).  
 83. New C.C. art. 3149 (2015).  
 84. See New C.C. art. 3153 (2015). 
 85. See Paul M. Hebert & Carlos E. Lazarus, Louisiana Legislation of 1938, 
1 LA. L. REV. 80, 108–10 (1938) (discussing the meaning and distinction 
between incorporeals that are “evidenced in writing” and those that are not). The 
statutes that previously dealt with these concepts were Louisiana Revised 
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Like the rules applicable to those written instruments required 
for the pledge of corporeal movables, only the pledgor’s signature is 
required on the written instrument concerning the pledge of things 
that are not corporeal movables.86 Unlike the pledge of corporeal 
movables, however, recordation of the written instrument may be 
required if the pledge involves a lease of immovable property,87 the 
rents from such property,88 or certain mineral interests or rights.89 
If what has been pledged is not a lessee’s obligation to pay rent 
but rather some other obligation outside the scope of UCC 9, then 
the pledge “is effective against third persons only from the time that 
the obligor has actual knowledge of the pledge or has been given 
notice of it.”90 Because pledge is a form of real security,91 and 
because it is important to ascertain the ranking order among 
creditors who may have a preference to the proceeds of a sale of 
real security, creditors may want to consider giving notice to third-
party obligors to assure the earliest possible date of the 
effectiveness of the pledge “against third persons” under New C.C. 
art. 3155. 
Moreover, notice to the third-party obligor is important because, 
until notice is given in writing directing the third-party obligor to 
make payments to the pledgee,92 the third-party obligor may 
continue to make payments to the pledgor. If the third-party obligor 
“renders performance”93 that “extinguishes the pledged obligation”94 
before receiving written notice to render performance to the pledgee, 
then the pledgee has no right to demand anything of the third-party 
obligor. 
New C.C. art. 3162 sets forth defenses that the third-party 
obligor may assert. Absent an agreement to the contrary by the 
third-party obligor,95 those defenses include “any defense arising 
out of the transaction that gave rise to the pledged obligation” as 
                                                                                                             
 
Statutes sections 9:4321–9:4323, repealed by Act No. 128, §18, 2001 La. Acts 
206, 378, effective July 1, 2001. 
 86. The pledgee’s acceptance is presumed. New C.C. art. 3150 (2015). 
 87. See infra Part IX. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See supra Part III.B.  
 90. New C.C. art. 3155 (2015). 
 91. New C.C. arts. 3137–3138 (2015). 
 92. New C.C. art. 3161 (2015). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. New C.C. art. 3162 (2015). 
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well as “any other defense that arises against the pledgor before the 
obligor has been given written notice of the pledge.”96  
C. Pledging Items Not Owned 
New C.C. art. 3152 continues the concept contained in Old 
C.C. art. 3144 and akin to the after-acquired-title doctrine.97 Even 
if a pledgor does not presently own an asset, a pledge is 
“established when the thing is acquired by the pledgor and the 
other requirements for the establishment of the pledge have been 
satisfied.”98 
VI. RIGHTS OF THE PLEDGEE 
A pledgee has a number of rights, including the right of 
retention as against the pledgor, the right to collect fruits, and 
either the right to exercise a privilege on the proceeds of the sale of 
the pledged item (if the item can be sold) or the right to 
performance (if the pledged item consists of performance by a 
third person). 
A. The Right of Retention 
Because a “contract of pledge is indivisible, notwithstanding 
the divisibility of the secured obligations,”99 a pledgee may refuse 
to return the pledged item to the pledgor until the extinguishment 
of the entirety of the obligations that the pledge secures.100 
Therefore, if a pledgor pledges three corporeal movables (not 
covered by UCC 9), each worth $100, to secure a $300 debt, the 
pledgor may not pay $200 to the pledgee and demand return of two 
of the three items.101 The creditor may retain possession of all the 
pledged items until the entire debt is completely extinguished. Of 
course, the pledgor and pledgee may contractually agree 
otherwise,102 but absent such an agreement, the pledgor’s remedy 
to regain the pledged items is to pay off the debt. 
                                                                                                             
 96. Id. 
 97. For a discussion of the after-acquired-title doctrine, see Lyons v. Fisher, 
847 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 98. New C.C. art. 3152 (2015). 
 99. New C.C. art. 3157 (2015). 
 100. New C.C. arts. 3156–3157 (2015). 
 101. New C.C. art. 3157 (2015). 
 102. A similar type of contractual agreement exists in the mortgage arena. 
When a subdivision is developed, a construction mortgage in favor of a lender is 
usually placed on the entire tract. Because mortgages, like pledges, are indivisible, 
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It should be noted that the pledgee’s right of retention is only 
against the pledgor. As Comment (b) to New C.C. art. 3156 states, 
this article “does not alter the longstanding rule that a pledgee may 
not resist seizure under judicial process, even if instituted by a 
creditor holding an inferior security right.” If judicial seizure 
occurs, the remedy for the pledgee is to intervene in the lawsuit 
and assert its real security rights.103 
B. The Pledgee’s Rights to Collect Fruits 
New C.C. art. 3159 permits a pledgee to “receive the fruits of 
the thing pledged,” to retain the fruits as security, and to “apply 
them to the secured obligation, even if not yet due.” New C.C. art. 
3159 is a one-sentence “simplification”104 of the pledgee’s right to 
collect fruits, “a common feature of the law of pledge in civilian 
jurisdictions.”105 
The Comments to New C.C. art. 3159 note that it is based on 
Old C.C. art. 3168. A brief discussion of the historical importance 
of the pledgee’s right to collect fruits may help in understanding 
the evolution of the rule.  
After the Civil War, when the Civil Code was completely 
revised in 1870, there were two ways to grant a security interest on 
immovables. The first was a mortgage—a non-possessory right 
that gave the creditor only the option of seizing and selling the 
property upon default.106 Under the mortgage articles, there was no 
way for a creditor to have any rights to crops (“fruits”) or rents 
(“civil fruits”)107 prior to default. The concept of a “crop pledge” 
                                                                                                             
 
the developer cannot unilaterally demand that the lender release the mortgage on 
each lot as it is sold. See C.C. art. 3280 (2015). Therefore, a developer and its 
lender typically enter into a contract stipulating a release price on each lot. As the 
lot is sold, the lender executes an act of partial release pursuant to the contractual 
provision. See, e.g., Schexnayder v. Capital Riverside Acres, 129 So. 139 (La. 
1930) (involving a partial release clause in a mortgage). 
 103. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1092 (2015) (discussing the procedural 
rules of intervention).  
 104. New C.C. art. 3159 cmt. (2015).  
 105. Id. 
 106. Louisiana Civil Code article 3278 (1870) provided: “Mortgage is a right 
granted to the creditor over the property of the debtor for the security of his debt, 
and gives him the power of having the property seized and sold in default of 
payment.” That concept was carried forward in current Louisiana Civil Code 
articles 3278 and 3279, amended by Act No. 652, 1991 La. Acts 2068, 2081–97. 
 107. Louisiana Civil Code article 551 provides in pertinent part: “Civil fruits 
are revenues derived from a thing by operation of law or by reason of a juridical 
act, such as rentals, interest, and certain corporate distributions.” See C.C. art. 
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did not arise until 1874,108 four years after the enactment of the 
1870 Civil Code.109 
In addition to mortgage, however, the Civil Code drafters 
allowed creditors to obtain a real security right to collect crops and 
rents through antichresis, a concept that appears in the Code 
Napoléon.110 Under Louisiana law, a creditor could hold a mortgage, 
an antichresis, or both.111 Because immovable property is capable of 
generating crops and rents, the antichresis articles specifically allowed 
the creditor to use “fruits” as they came due, to apply them to both 
principal and interest as they came due,112 as well as to use the 
“fruits” to pay taxes and make repairs on the property.113  
                                                                                                             
 
551 (2015) (emphasis added) (amended by Act No. 103, 1976 La. Acts 321–
430); see also Cooper v. Cappel, 29 La. Ann. 213 (1877) (stating that “rents are 
civil fruits”).  
 108. The crop pledge act was originally enacted by Act No. 66, 1874 La. 
Acts 114–15.  
 109. For a detailed discussion of the Louisiana crop pledge, see L. David 
Cromwell, Secured Interests in Louisiana Crops: The 2010 Legislative Revision, 
71 LA. L. REV. 1176, 1180 (2011). 
 110. See Joseph Dainow, 1972 Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of 
Louisiana, in 16–17 WEST’S LA. STAT. ANN. (West 1973) (demonstrating that 
all of the antichresis articles had direct parallels to the Code Napoleon). 
 111. The old version Louisiana Civil Code article 3181 provided:  
Every provision, which is contained in the present title with respect to 
the antichresis, can not [sic] prejudice the rights which third persons 
may have on the immovable, given in pledge by way of antichresis, 
such as a privilege or mortgage. The creditor, who is in possession by 
way of antichresis can not [sic] have any right of preference on the 
other creditors; but if he has by any other title, some privilege or 
mortgage lawfully established or preserved thereon, he will come in his 
rank as any other creditor. 
Old C.C. art. 3181 (2013) (repealed 2014) (emphasis added). See also 
Pickersgill v. Brown, 7 La. Ann. 297, 314 (1852):  
A mortgage in favor of one creditor, not put into action by fieri facias 
or writ of seizure, may coexist with an antichresis in favor of another 
creditor. The antichresis operates upon the fruits, which the creditor, 
holding it, is thereby authorized, by his debtor, to gather. A mortgage 
affects the land. If the holder of the antichresis gathers the fruits before 
the mortgage creditor seizes, he can apply them to his debt. Just as the 
owner himself would have held the gathered fruits free from the 
mortgage, had he granted no antichresis [sic]. The creditor in 
antichresis, when he has gathered the fruits, owes his account to the 
owner, and not to the inactive mortgagee.  
Pickersgill, 7 La. Ann. at 314 (emphasis added). 
 112. Old C.C. art. 3176 provided, in pertinent part:  
The creditor acquires by this contract the right of reaping the fruits or 
other revenues of the immovables to him given in pledge, on condition 
of deducting annually their proceeds from the interest, if any be due 
him, and afterwards from the principal of his debt. 
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Thus, in 1870, if one wanted to pledge rent income or crops as 
security for a debt, it could be done as a “pledge,” for that word 
encompassed antichresis.114 These articles remained unchanged 
from 1870 until 2014. Under the 2014 amendments, antichresis has 
been abolished.115 
C. Sale of a Pledged Corporeal Movable 
New C.C. art. 3158 permits the pledgor and pledgee of a 
corporeal movable to enter into a contract allowing the pledgee to 
“dispose of the thing pledged at public auction or by private 
sale.”116 This is in addition to the pledgee’s right to proceed by 
ordinary process, or executory process if the documents are in the 
proper form.117  
New C.C. art. 3158 cautions that, at the public auction or 
private sale, the pledgee “shall act reasonably in disposing of the 
thing and shall account to the pledgor for any proceeds of the 
disposition in excess of the amount needed to satisfy the secured 
obligation.”118 The Comments to this article state that the rule is 
derived from Old C.C. arts. 3165 and 3172.119 There are cases 
under the pre-2014 articles in which courts have carefully 
scrutinized private sales of pledged items and have overturned 
private sales where the pledgee did not act “fairly and in good 
faith.”120 
                                                                                                             
 
Old C.C. art. 3176 (2013) (repealed 2014) (emphasis added).  
 113. Old C.C. art. 3177 (2013) (repealed 2014). 
 114. The former Civil Code articles used the term pledge to encompass both 
the pledge of corporeal movables, which it called “pawn” (Old C.C. arts. 3154–
3174), and antichresis (Old C.C. arts. 3176–3181).  
 115. New C.C. art. 3141 cmt. d (2015).  
 116. See supra Part V.A (evaluating whether any corporeal movables 
currently can be pledged). Note that an agreement to dispose of the pledged item 
at a public or private auction can be entered into as part of the pledge agreement; 
it does not have to be an agreement entered into after the pledgor is in default. 
The reason that this can be done in the pledge agreement and is not prohibited 
by the Alcolea case and its progeny is that this is merely an agreement on how to 
sell the collateral; it is not an agreement to give the pledgee automatic 
ownership of the collateral upon default. See supra note 44; see generally 
Alcolea v. Smith, 90 So. 769, 771 (1922).  
 117. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2635 (2015). 
 118. New C.C. art. 3158 (2015). 
 119. New C.C. art. 3158 cmt. (2015). 
 120. See, e.g., Elmer v. Elmer, 203 So. 2d 391, 394 (La. Ct. App. 1967). The 
court stated: 
In our opinion the ‘sale’ of the stock for the price and in the manner 
and for the purpose it was made shows a ‘dealing with the property 
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Pledgees who wish to utilize a contractual right to a non-
judicial “public auction”121 or private sale under New C.C. art. 
3158, however, need to take the Deficiency Judgment Act122 into 
account. This is because—absent a private agreement that meets 
the requirements of the statutory exceptions to a Deficiency 
Judgment Act involving consumer or commercial loans123—the 
“public auction” or private sale will result in the creditor not being 
able to collect any deficiency if the sale proceeds do not satisfy the 
obligation the pledge secures. The 2014 amendments to the Civil 
Code do not contain the same rules as UCC 9, which permit a 
creditor to maintain a deficiency after a private sale held in a 
“commercially reasonable” manner.124 
VII. THE PERMISSIBLE “NEGATIVE PLEDGE” AND A 
NEW PROHIBITION  
New C.C. art. 3163 changes Louisiana law. It invalidates clauses 
that restrict the rights of a payment recipient to encumber the 
payment obligation.125 Yet, it permits the continued enforcement of 
the traditional “negative pledge.” 126  
                                                                                                             
 
incompatible with the pledgee’s fiduciary character.’ The pretended 
sale amounted to no more than an appropriation by the pledgee of the 
subject of the pledge to serve his own personal ends and should be set 
aside. We note parenthetically that Oscar B. Elmer not only took 
possession of the pledged stock but also retained and still has in his 
possession Mr. and Mrs. Joseph C. Elmer’s uncancelled note. 
Id. at 397. 
 121. See New C.C. art. 3158 (2015). 
 122. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4106–4108.3 (2006). 
 123. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4108.1–4108.2 (2006). 
 124. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-607 to 10:9-616 (Supp. 2015). 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 10:9-610(b) states:  
(b) Commercially reasonable disposition. Every aspect of a disposition 
of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other 
terms, must be commercially reasonable. If commercially reasonable, a 
secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private 
proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at 
any time and place and on any terms. A disclaimer or modification of 
warranties in a secured party’s disposition of collateral is commercially 
reasonable. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-610(b) (Supp. 2015). For a more detailed 
discussion of this issue, see Michael H. Rubin & Jamie Seymour, Deficiency 
Judgments: A Louisiana Overview, 69 LA. L. REV. 785 (2009). 
 125. New C.C. art. 3163 states: 
A clause in a contract restricting the pledge of the rights of a party to 
payments that are or will become due under the contract, making the 
pledge or its enforcement a default under the contract, or providing that 
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A “negative pledge” is a contractual provision that does not 
grant a creditor any security in an asset but which allows the 
creditor to demand immediate repayment of a loan if one or more 
described assets are encumbered by the debtor. “Negative pledges” 
are routinely used in loan documentation, not only in Louisiana but 
also throughout the country.127 It is one of the many non-payment 
default clauses lenders use to assure that borrowers maintain 
sufficient assets to repay the loan.128  
Two examples based on the Comments to New C.C. art. 3163 
may be helpful in explaining the distinction that the article draws 
between permissible “negative pledges” and impermissible 
restrictions.129  
                                                                                                             
 
the other party is excused from performance or may terminate the 
contract on account of the pledge, is without effect.  
 126. As stated in Comment (d) to New C.C. art. 3163, the amendment to this 
article is not intended to “invalidate the arrangement commonly known as a 
‘negative pledge.’” See infra note 129 (quoting article 3163 comment (d) in 
full). 
 127. See, e.g., Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative 
Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (1999); 
Peter F. Coogan et al., The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination 
Agreements, Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge 
Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79 HARV. L. REV. 229 (1965). The 
United States Supreme Court and federal circuit courts have decided cases that 
involve or refer to negative pledge provisions in contracts. See, e.g., Grupo 
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999); 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 906 F.2d 884, 889 (2d Cir. 1990); 
Atlantic Tele–Network Co. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n of the Virgin Is., 841 F.2d 
70 (3d Cir. 1988); Whitfield v. Pennington, 832 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1987); In re 
Cont’l Res. Corp., 799 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir. 1986); Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A. v. Gems-by-Gordon, Inc., 649 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1981). In addition, at 
least one Louisiana case has used the phrase “negative pledge” in an opinion. 
See McClanahan v. McClanahan, 868 So. 2d 844, 860 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 128. See, e.g., Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants in Commercial Loan 
Documentation: Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335 (1991). One 
Louisiana federal court has enforced an arrangement similar to a negative pledge 
provision when a clause in an employment contract prohibited a financial 
services employee from signing certain suretyship agreements. See Flanner v. 
Chase Inv. Servs., Corp., No. 3:11-0940, 2013 WL 5533569 (W.D. La. Oct. 4, 
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 13-31132, 2015 WL 408602 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 2, 2015). 
 129. Comment (d) to New C.C. art. 3163 states: 
(d) This Article does not invalidate the arrangement commonly known 
as a “negative pledge” by which an obligor agrees with one of his 
creditors that he will not encumber one or more of his assets in favor of 
another creditor. Thus, a lessor may validly agree with one of his 
creditors that he will not pledge to another creditor his rights to rents 
arising under a lease of an immovable. The reason that this Article does 
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Example #1. Landlord owns immovable property leased to 
Tenant. Landlord enters into a contract with Creditor that 
does not grant Creditor any pledge of the rental income 
arising from the property; however, Landlord agrees in the 
loan documents that it will not pledge rights to the rental 
income to any person or entity and, if it does so, such an 
action will violate the loan agreement allowing Creditor to 
declare a default and immediately demand the full amount 
of the loan.  
This type of clause is a “negative pledge” permitted by New 
C.C. art. 3163. The reason that this provision is permitted and not 
prohibited by New C.C. art. 3163 is that the provision is extraneous 
to the lease, which is the contract under which payments “are or will 
become due”;130 further, Creditor is not a party to the lease.  
Example #2. The facts are the same as in Example #1, but 
Tenant has insisted on inserting into the lease a provision 
prohibiting Landlord from pledging the Tenant’s rents. 
New C.C. art. 3163 prohibits the enforcement of this provision 
because it is contained in the lease, which is the contract under 
which the payments “are or will become due”;131 moreover, Tenant 
is “a party” to the lease.132  
                                                                                                             
 
not apply to such an agreement is that the contract restricting the pledge 
is not the contract under which the pledged payments will become due. 
In the example given, the payments arise under the lease between the 
lessor and lessee, while the prohibition against pledging those 
payments arises under the contract between the lessor and his creditor. 
On the other hand, this Article invalidates a stipulation in a lease 
whereby the lessor agrees with the lessee that the rents under the lease 
may not be pledged to the lessor’s creditors. Such a stipulation, if it 
were permitted under this Article, would in effect make the rents under 
the lease insusceptible of pledge. There is no similar consequence with 
a negative pledge, which is a mere contractual covenant that does not 
have the effect of nullifying a pledge made in violation of its terms. 
New C.C. art. 3163 cmt. d (2015).  
 130. New C.C. art. 3163 (2015). 
 131. Id. 
 132. New C.C. art. 3163 cmts. b, c (2015). Those Comments state: 
(b) Under Article 2653 (Rev. 1993), a right cannot be assigned when 
the contract from which it arises prohibits the assignment of that right. 
Interpreting that Article, the Supreme Court has held that there is no 
public policy precluding a clause prohibiting assignment of rights under 
an insurance contract. By its terms, however, Article 2653 (Rev. 1993) 
applies to sales and does not necessarily apply to a mere pledge or the 
granting of a security interest. Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code generally voids anti-assignment clauses that prohibit a security 
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Another distinction between this type of prohibited clause and 
a permitted “negative pledge” is that the latter does not encumber 
any property and does not invalidate the pledge; it merely operates 
to define a non-monetary default allowing a loan to be accelerated.  
The public policy distinctions between a permitted “negative 
pledge” and a clause prohibited by New C.C. art. 3163 are 
understandable. Allowing enforcement of a contract by which 
Tenant has sought to prohibit Landlord from pledging rent would 
relieve Tenant of any rent obligation to anyone other than Landlord 
and would lessen the value of the rental income stream, which is a 
primary source of collateral that lenders use to secure loans on 
commercial properties.133  
The prohibition in New C.C. art. 3163 applies to more than just 
agreements between a landlord and tenant. It applies to all payment 
obligations outside the scope of UCC 9 where an obligee is 
ostensibly prevented by contract from pledging the obligor’s 
contractual payments to the obligee. 
                                                                                                             
 
interest and specifically provides this rule prevails over Article 2653 
(Rev. 1993). Similarly, former R.S. 9:4401(G)(4) provided that any 
term in a lease was ineffective if it prohibited assignment of rent, 
prohibited creation of a security right in rent or required the lessee’s 
consent to the assignment or security right. 
(c) This Article applies to all pledges of an obligation of a third person 
to make payment, including both pledges of movables that are outside 
the scope of Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and pledges 
of the lessor’s interest in the lease of an immovable and its rents. The 
effect of this Article is, however, limited to the pledge of payments that 
are or will become due under a contract. This Article does not apply to 
the encumbrance of other rights that the pledgor may have under the 
contract. 
 133. In commercial transactions, the rental income stream not only is the 
source of income for the Landlord, it also often forms a primary security sought 
by creditors who provide financing to landlords. As one law review article 
states: “Rents are a significant part of the security for loans secured by income-
producing properties such as office buildings, shopping centers, and 
apartments.” Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Crazy After all These Years: The 
Absolute Assignment of Rents in Mortgage Loan Transactions, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
487, 487 (2007). Another law review article asserts: “An assignment of leases 
and rents can serve a number of practical purposes, but its most significant 
purpose is to provide a mortgage lender with the ability to collect rents that 
accrue from the mortgaged real property between the mortgagor’s default and a 
completed foreclosure.” R. Wilson Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents: 
the New Uniform Assignment of Rents Act, 71 MO. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006). 
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VIII. MODIFICATIONS, TERMINATIONS, AND SUBSTITUTIONS 
OF PLEDGED OBLIGATIONS  
New C.C. arts. 3164 through 3167 create a series of related 
principles governing the effect of an amendment, modification, or 
substitution of pledged obligations. The source of these rules is 
found not in prior Civil Code articles but rather in UCC 9 and in 
the superseded statute134 governing the assignment of rents.135 
Under the amended Civil Code articles, if a pledged obligation 
is modified or terminated, or if a new obligation is substituted, then 
the “agreement is effective against the pledgee without his 
consent”136 if this is done prior to the obligor having been given 
notice of the pledge. On the other hand, if the obligor of the 
pledged obligation has been given written notice of the pledge, a 
subsequent “agreement modifying or extinguishing the pledged 
obligation is without effect against the pledgee unless made with his 
consent.”137 The 2014 amendments also permit the pledgor and 
pledgee to agree that an event of default occurs if there is a 
modification, termination, or substitution of the pledged obligation.138  
Although Part IX of this Rumination covers leases in more 
detail, a series of examples involving modification, termination, 
and substitution of a lease illustrates the rules these amended 
articles articulate. Each of these examples assumes (unless 
otherwise stated) that the rights of Landlord (the pledgor) in the 
lease had been “fully earned.”139 
Example #3: Landlord and Tenant entered into a written 
lease dated February 1, 2015; the lease was properly 
recorded in the parish public records. The lease is for five 
years and requires monthly rental payments of $5,000.  
 
Landlord owed Creditor $1 million on a line-of-credit loan. 
To secure the loan, Landlord pledged to Creditor the 
                                                                                                             
 134. The pre-2014 version of the assignment of rents statute was Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:4401 and the rent assignment provisions moved into 
the Civil Code’s pledge articles. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (2009 & 
Supp. 2015) (amended by Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts). See infra Part IX. 
 135. See New C.C. arts. 3165–3167 (2015). 
 136. New C.C. art. 3164 (2015). 
 137. Id. 
 138. New C.C. art. 3166 (2015). 
 139. New C.C. art. 3164 (2015). The reason that the Landlord should have 
“fully earned” the rights in these examples is because the modification involves 
past rent that is clearly due and no question has been raised concerning whether 
Tenant had a defense against Landlord’s right to the past-due rent. For a further 
discussion on the “fully earned” concept, see infra Example 6.  
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Landlord’s rights to collect rent under the lease. The pledge 
was made March 1, 2015, and recorded in the appropriate 
public records,140 but Tenant was not notified of the pledge. 
It turns out that Tenant had not made any rental payments to 
Landlord in February or March. On April 1, 2015, Landlord 
and Tenant modified the lease. In exchange for Landlord 
forgiving the two missed rental payments, the Lease was 
shorted by two months. 
Under C.C. art. 3164, because Tenant had not been notified of 
the pledge by either Creditor or Landlord, the modification was 
effective against Creditor. On the other hand, if Creditor had an 
agreement with Landlord that any modification of the lease would 
be an event of default, then under New C.C. art. 3166, Creditor 
may declare a default in the $1 million loan the pledge secures.  
Example #4. The facts are the same as in Example #3, 
above, except that rather than modifying the lease on April 
1, 2015, Landlord and Tenant agreed in good faith to 
terminate it because Tenant was suffering cash-flow issues. 
In this instance, the result is the same as in Example #3. 
Because Tenant had not received notice of the pledge prior to the 
termination, the termination was effective against Creditor. 
Nonetheless, if Creditor had an agreement with Landlord that 
termination of the lease would be an event of default, Creditor may 
declare a default in the $1 million loan the pledge secures.  
Example #5. The facts are the same as in Example #4, 
above, except that rather than just terminating the lease on 
April 1, 2015, Landlord and Tenant agreed in good faith to 
cancel the five-year $5,000/month lease because not only 
did Tenant have cash flow difficulties but also because 
Tenant had found Retailer who agreed to sign a new lease 
with Landlord on the same space, with the new lease 
extending for five years for a rent of $4,800/month ($200 
less per month than Tenant had agreed to pay under its 
lease). On April 1, 2015, Landlord and Tenant canceled 
Tenant’s lease, and Landlord and Retailer entered into the 
new lease. 
Under New C.C. art. 3164, the substitution of a “new 
contract”141 is effective against Creditor because Tenant had not 
                                                                                                             
 140. See infra Part IX.B for a discussion of the differences between making a 
pledge of rents effective against the lessee and effective to third parties. 
 141. New C.C. art. 3164 does not expressly require that the “new contract” 
be between the original parties (here Landlord and Tenant). It just requires that 
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been notified in writing of the Landlord’s pledge.142 The pledge 
continues on the rent under the lease between Landlord and 
Retailer. As in the prior examples, Creditor may declare a default 
in the $1 million loan if the loan documents prevented substitution 
of a new lease. 
Note, however, that this example may not occur in the real 
world, because typically a pledge of rents would encompass all the 
rents arising from the building. In such instances, Retailer’s lease 
would be subject to the pledge by contract regardless of whether 
the termination of Tenant’s lease was effective against Creditor. 
Example #6. The facts are the same as in Examples #3 and 
#4, involving a modification or termination on April 1, 
2015, of the February 1, 2015 lease between Landlord and 
Tenant. In this Example #6, however, Creditor notified 
Tenant in writing on March 25, 2015, of the pledge to 
Creditor. Thus, Tenant had notice of the pledge prior to the 
April 1, 2015 modification or termination dealt with in the 
prior examples.  
Under New C.C. art. 3169, the “pledge of the lessor’s rights in 
the lease of an immovable and its rents” is “effective as to the 
lessee from the time that he is given written notice of the 
pledge.”143 Because the Landlord’s rights had been “fully 
earned”144 and because Tenant had received written notice, New 
C.C. art. 3164 requires that unless Creditor consents, the 
modification or termination “is without effect” against Creditor. 
Because Creditor had not been asked about the modification or 
termination and had not consented, Creditor may seek to require 
Tenant to pay Creditor $5,000/month for the full five years under 
the original lease provisions.145  
The rule of New C.C. art. 3164 applies only if both written 
notice to Tenant had occurred and the lease obligations had “been 
                                                                                                             
 
“[t]he parties to a contract from which a pledged obligation arises may agree to . . . 
substitute a new contract.” An example of a “new contract” between only 
Landlord and Tenant would be where, in exchange for forgiveness of past-due 
rent, Landlord and Tenant agree that Tenant will move to new, smaller space in 
Landlord’s building.  
 142. New C.C. art. 3169 (2015). 
 143. Id. 
 144. New C.C. art. 3164 (2015). See also supra note 139 (discussing why 
Landlord’s rights are “fully earned” in cases involving past-due rent). 
 145. The only right Creditor has in this instance is to seek to collect the lease 
payments. See infra Part IX.E. Under New C.C. art. 3174, Creditor may not 
invoke judicial process “to cause the rights of the lessor to be sold.” 
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fully earned by the pledgor’s performance.” It is anticipated that 
there may be litigation requiring interpretation of the phrase “fully 
earned.” The Comments to New C.C. art. 3164 appear to invite 
courts to consider by analogy the jurisprudence dealing with 
similar provisions of UCC 9.146  
To illustrate the issues that may arise, assume in this Example 
#6 that Creditor claims that the modification or termination had no 
effect because Landlord was not in default in his obligations under 
the lease with Tenant. On the other hand, assume Tenant asserts as 
a defense that Landlord’s rights were not “fully earned” because 
the heating and cooling equipment had failed on March 23, 2015 
(two days before the notice from Creditor to Tenant was given), 
because the equipment had not worked properly since then, and 
because Landlord had failed to remedy the situation despite 
repeated requests from Tenant. Tenant’s assertion is that, because 
Landlord’s performance under its lease obligations was in default 
and Landlord’s rights were “not fully earned,” the written notice 
Creditor had given came too late under New C.C. art. 3164.  
Tenant may not seek to have Creditor correct the heating and 
cooling deficiencies because, under New C.C. art. 3167, in the 
absence of Creditor’s “assumption” of these obligations in a 
contract with Landlord, “the existence of a pledge does not impose 
upon the pledgee [here, Creditor] liability for the pledgor’s acts or 
omissions, nor does it bind the pledgee to perform the pledgor’s 
obligations.” 
Assume further that Creditor seeks to counter Tenant’s assertion 
concerning Landlord’s failure to fully perform by pointing to a 
                                                                                                             
 146. New C.C. art. 3164, Comment (b), notes that its rules are derived from 
provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 10:9-405(a) and 10:9-405(b). 
These provisions read: 
§9-405. Modification of assigned contract 
(a) Effect of modification on assignee. A modification of or substitution 
for an assigned contract is effective against an assignee if made in good 
faith. The assignee acquires corresponding rights under the modified or 
substituted contract. The assignment may provide that the modification 
or substitution is a breach of contract by the assignor. This Subsection 
is subject to Subsections (b) through (d). 
(b) Applicability of Subsection (a). Subsection (a) applies to the extent 
that: 
(1) the right to payment or a part thereof under an assigned contract 
has not been fully earned by performance; or 
(2) the right to payment or a part thereof has been fully earned by 
performance and the account debtor has not received notification of 
the assignment under R.S. 10:9-406(a). 
See, e.g., In Re Sycom Enter., L.P., 310 B.R. 669 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) 
(analyzing UCC art. 9-405); cf. 9B WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-405 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
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provision in the lease purporting to obligate Tenant to pay rent every 
month, regardless of Landlord’s failure to maintain the systems that 
provide electricity, heating, and cooling to the premises.147  
As can be seen, this may become an area where Louisiana courts 
will have to adjudicate what the phrase “fully earned” means.148  
Example #7. The facts are the same as in Example #6 with 
one alteration. Creditor gave written notice of the pledge to 
Tenant on March 25, 2015, but the failure of the heating 
and cooling equipment occurred one day later, on March 
26, 2015.  
Now, Creditor may claim that because, at the time of the notice, 
the heating and cooling equipment was working properly, Landlord’s 
rights had been “fully earned” for past-due rent at the time notice to 
Tenant was given. Thus, Creditor may argue that the modification or 
termination was not enforceable against Creditor.149  
IX. THE PLEDGE OF A LESSOR’S RIGHTS IN A LEASE OF AN 
IMMOVABLE AND ITS RENTS 
In connection with leases, the 2014 pledge amendments apply 
only to the lease of immovables. The Louisiana Lease of Movables 
Act deals with movables.150 Movables that are leased can be 
encumbered by a security interest under UCC 9,151 and the rents 
                                                                                                             
 147. Whether such a clause would be enforceable is beyond the scope of this 
Rumination. For more discussion of this issue, see Frona M. Powell, 
Unconscionability in the Lease of Commercial Real Estate, 35 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 197 (2000), and Sidney G. Saltz, Allocation of Insurable Risks in 
Commercial Leases, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479 (2002).  
 148. It is beyond the scope of this Rumination to address whether a Landlord 
has “fully earned” the right to future rents such that an amendment to a lease, 
reducing future rents, would be within the scope of these new articles. This is in 
contrast to the examples above, where the term of the lease is being reduced or 
cancelled because of Tenant’s non-payment of past-due rent. 
 149. One can envision further litigation on whether the Tenant has a valid 
claim that it was Landlord’s failure to properly maintain the heating and cooling 
equipment prior to the March 25, 2014, notice that led to the equipment failure, 
thus bolstering Tenant’s argument that Landlord’s rights to collect rent had not 
been “fully earned.”  
 150. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3301–9:3342 (2009 & Supp. 2015).  
 151. Corporeal movables that are being leased typically fit UCC 9’s 
definition of “equipment” or “consumer goods.” See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
10:9-102(a)(23), (33) (2002 & Supp. 2015); see also id. § 9:3342(B) (2009) 
(dealing with the relationship between the Lease of Movables Act and UCC 9). 
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from such movables can be subjected to a UCC 9 security 
interest.152  
Prior to the 2014 amendments, a creditor who wished to obtain 
security on a lease of an immovable or its rents had to use the 
provisions of former Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4401, a 
complex and much-amended provision153 entitled “conditional or 
collateral assignment of leases and rents.” These statutory rules 
have been moved to the Civil Code and are now dealt with by New 
C.C. arts. 3168–3175 as well as by amendments to the registry 
articles of the Civil Code.154 
The 2014 amendments apply not only to the pledge of rents by 
a lessor, but also to the pledge of rents by a sublessor.155 Although 
the 2014 amendments track the former provisions of section 
9:4401 in a number of respects, they change the prior law by 
requiring all pledges of leases of immovables and of the rentals of 
such leases to be recorded in the mortgage records.156 The 
amendments change the law to permit an inferior pledgee to collect 
rent without accounting to a superior pledgee.157 The amendments 
prohibit a judicial sale of a pledged lease or of pledged rents.158 
                                                                                                             
 152. See id. § 10:9-102(a)(2) (2002 & Supp. 2015) (stating that “‘Account,’ . . . 
means a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by 
performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, 
assigned” (emphasis added)). 
 153. Revised Statutes section 9:4401 (added by Act No. 321, § 1, 1980 La. 
Acts 824–25, and amended by Act No. 592, § 5, 1985 La. Acts 1070–90, 
effective July 13, 1985; Act No. 130, § 1, 1987 La. Acts 423, 424–25, effective 
June 18, 1987; Act No. 137, § 4, 1989 La. Acts 527, 532–49, effective Sept. 1, 
1989; Act No. 1079, § 3, 1990 La. Acts 2735, 2738–50, effective Sept. 1, 1990; 
Act No. 1087, § 3, 1995 La. Acts 2941, 2943–54; Act No. 281, § 2, 2014 La. 
Acts, effective Jan. 1, 2015). 
 154. See New C.C. arts. 3346, 3354–3368 (2015). A discussion of the 
transitional rules concerning the pre-2014 law and the post-2014 amendments 
are beyond the scope of this Rumination. The transitional rules are contained in 
the newly enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4403. 
 155. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (2009 & Supp. 2015). As Comment (b) 
to this provision states: 
(b) This Section expressly provides that a pledge may be created by 
either a lessor or a sublessor. In the case of a pledge created by a 
sublessor, the pledge encumbers his rights under the sublease, but not 
his rights under the underlying lease from his own lessor. The rights of 
a lessee under a lease, as well as the rights of a sublessee under a 
sublease, are not susceptible of pledge but instead are encumbered by a 
mortgage. 
Id. § 9:4401 cmt. b (2009 & Supp. 2015) (citations omitted).  
 156. New C.C. art. 3346 (2015). 
 157. New C.C. art. 3173 (2015). 
 158. New C.C. art. 3174 (2015). The Comments to New C.C. art. 3174 state 
that this article is “new and has no counterpart in either the Louisiana Civil Code 
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The amendments also clarify the law concerning a pledge of items 
classified as “rent” under the Louisiana Mineral Code.159  
A. What Can Be Pledged in a Lease of Immovables 
The landlord of immovables may mortgage the immovable.160 
The landlord may grant a lease of an immovable and obtain by 
operation of law a lessor’s privilege161 on the property of tenants 
and subtenants on the leased premises,162 as well as a limited right 
to pursue these items when they have been removed from the 
premises.163 The tenant may mortgage the lease.164 
If a creditor, however, wants to obtain a security interest in the 
landlord’s lease or in the rental stream, the only way to do so is 
through a pledge.  
New C.C. art. 3168 permits a landlord to pledge the entirety of 
a single lease, all the leases on a specified immovable, all the rents 
under one or more leases, or just some of the rents under one or 
more leases. As the Comments to this article note, the “scope of 
what is pledged is a matter of contract between the parties.”165 
                                                                                                             
 
of 1870 or former R.S. 9:4401.” New C.C. art. 3174 cmt. a (2015). The 2014 
amendments did not continue the language of former R.S. 9:4401(a) that a real 
security right in rents becomes “absolute upon assignor’s default.” LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (added by Act No. 321, § 1, 1980 La. Acts 824) (repealed 
2014) (emphasis added). 
 159. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 160. Civil Code articles 3278–3298 govern conventional mortgages on 
immovables.  
 161. Louisiana Civil Code article 2707 defines a lessor’s privilege. For more 
discussion on this, see Michael H. Rubin and S. Jess Sperry, Lease Financing in 
Louisiana, 59 LA. L. REV. 846, 855–61 (1999). 
 162. Louisiana Civil Code article 2708 governs the scope of lessor’s 
privilege over property of subtenants and states that the “privilege extends to the 
movables of the sublessee but only to the extent that the sublessee is indebted to 
his sublessor at the time the lessor exercises his right.” 
 163. C.C. art. 2710 (2015). 
 164. Louisiana Civil Code article 3286 allows a lessee to mortgage his 
“rights in a lease of an immovable with his rights in the buildings and other 
constructions on the immovable.” This is sometimes referred to by the common-
law term “leasehold mortgage.” See Carriere v. Bank of La., 702 So. 2d 648, 
665–67 (La. 1996); Rubin & Sperry, supra note 161, at 862–64 (discussing the 
origin of the term “leasehold”); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 cmt. b 
(2009 & Supp. 2015) (quoted in supra note 155). 
 165. New C.C. art. 3168 cmt. b (2015). 
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B. How the Pledge Is Made Effective Between the Parties, to the 
Tenant, and to Third Parties 
A pledge of a lease of an immovable or its rents is made 
effective only by execution of a written contract between the 
pledgor and pledgee.166 An act of pledge may be a separate 
document or it may be contained in a mortgage.167 An act of 
pledge does not need to be witnessed or notarized, and the pledgee 
does not have to sign it.168 It should be noted, however, that if an 
act of pledge is not in authentic form, it is not “self-proving.”169 
Many attorneys prefer to use authentic acts170 for documents that 
are to be recorded in the public records. 
The written contract “must state precisely the nature and 
situation of the immovable and must state the amount of the 
secured obligation or the maximum amount of secured obligations 
that may be outstanding from time to time.”171 The Comments to 
New C.C. art. 3168 note that description requirements are 
“identical” to those required for describing immovables subject to 
a mortgage.172  
A pledge of a lease or its rents is effective against third parties 
only if it is recorded in the mortgage records of the parish where 
the immovable is located.173 This rule applies regardless of 
whether the pledge is contained in a mortgage or a separate act of 
                                                                                                             
 166. New C.C. art. 3149 (2015). 
 167. New C.C. art. 3170 (2015). 
 168. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
 169. An act that is self-proving can be introduced into evidence without 
proof that parties whose signatures appear on the document in fact are the 
persons they purport to be. See, e.g., Succession of Ruppert, 602 So. 2d 157, 159 
(La. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that an authentic act is “self-proving under LSA-
C.C. art. 1835”). 
 170. The requirements of an authentic act are set forth in Louisiana Civil 
Code article 1833. 
 171. New C.C. art. 3168 (2015). 
 172. New C.C. art. 3168 cmt. c (2015). The description requirements for 
mortgages are contained in Civil Code article 3288. C.C. art. 3288 (2015). 
 173. New C.C. arts. 3346, 3169–3170 (2015). Note, however, that Act 281 
did not alter Louisiana Civil Code article 3347, which provides: “The effect of 
recordation arises when an instrument is filed with the recorder and is unaffected 
by subsequent errors or omissions of the recorder. An instrument is filed with a 
recorder when he accepts it for recordation in his office.” The Louisiana 
Supreme Court in Wede v. Niche Marketing USA, LLC, 52 So. 3d 60 (La. 2010), 
dealt with the distinction between filing and recordation in connection with a 
judicial mortgage. It appears possible that, under article 3347, if the pledge is 
filed and is timely recorded, the effect of recordation may affect third parties 
from the time of the filing. See, e.g., Kinnebrew v. Tri-Con Prod. Corp., 154 So. 
2d 433 (La. 1963); Opelousas Fin. Co. v. Reddell, 119 So. 770 (La. 1929) 
(illustrating the approach of older cases on recordation and filing). 
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pledge.174 This is a change from the pre-2014-amendment law, 
where acts of “assignment” of leases were recorded only in the 
conveyance records, but acts of assignment of leases contained in a 
mortgage were recorded only in the mortgage records.175 The 2014 
amendments continue to recognize that a pledge of leases may be 
contained in a mortgage.176 
Regardless of whether or when the pledge is made effective 
against third parties, however, a lessee is affected only from the 
point of time it receives a written notice of the pledge.177  
C. The Length of the Effect on Third Parties of a Pledge of Leases 
or Rents  
The 2014 amendments incorporated the rules of a pledge of 
leases or rents into the rules concerning how long mortgages affect 
third parties.178 This is appropriate, considering the fact that such 
pledges are often contained in mortgages179 and because all such 
pledges are now recorded in the mortgage records.180 
If the act of pledge reflects that the obligation it secures is due 
in less than nine years, or if it cannot be ascertained from the act of 
pledge when the obligation it secures is due, the effect of 
recordation continues for ten years from the date of the 
document.181 If the act of pledge reflects that the obligation it 
secures is due nine years or more from the date of the document, 
the effect of recordation is six years from the maturity date of the 
obligation.182 Acts of timely reinscription preserve the original 
effective date for an additional ten years from the date of 
reinscription.183 
Example #8. Landlord and Tenant entered into a lease of an 
immovable on June 1, 2015. On June 15, 2015, Landlord 
and Creditor entered into a loan agreement; Landlord signed 
a negotiable note payable in three annual installments, the 
first installment due July 15, 2016, and the last installment 
due July 15, 2018. On June 15, 2015, Landlord and Creditor 
                                                                                                             
 174. New C.C. arts. 3346, 3169–3170 (2015). 
 175. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401(A)(1) (added by Act No. 321, § 1, 
1980 La. Acts 824) (repealed 2014). 
 176. New C.C. art. 3170 (2015).  
 177. New C.C. art. 3169 (2015). See supra Part VIII (Example #7). 
 178. See New C.C. arts. 3357–3365 (2015).  
 179. See, e.g., C.C. art. 3170 (2015).  
 180. See discussion supra Part IX.B. 
 181. New C.C. arts. 3357–3358 (2015).  
 182. Id. 
 183. New C.C. art. 3364 (2015). 
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also entered into a written act of pledge of the lease and all 
rents under the lease. The act of pledge contained all the 
necessary terms and conditions184 and described the note it 
secured as well as the payment provisions of the note. 
Creditor, however, did not record the act of pledge in the 
appropriate parish mortgage records until August 1, 2015. 
The result is that the pledge did not begin to affect third parties 
until it was recorded on August 1, 2015.185 It will cease affecting 
third parties on June 15, 2025. The reason is because the note is 
due in less than nine years from its date,186 and third parties are 
affected for ten years “from the date” of the contract of pledge,187 
not ten years from the date of the lease, and not ten years from the 
date of recordation of the act of pledge. 
Even though the effect of recordation of the pledge continues 
until June 15, 2025, the note itself may prescribe in 2023 (five 
years from its due date)188 unless acknowledged or unless 
prescription has been interrupted. A pledge may interrupt 
prescription under the “constant acknowledgment rule.”189 
What third parties can and cannot ascertain from the public 
records is essentially the same as the rule applicable to mortgages. 
Third parties cannot ascertain from the public records how much, 
if anything, has been paid on the note the pledge secures and 
cannot ascertain whether prescription has been interrupted190 or 
whether the note has prescribed because of non-payment. Thus, 
third parties examining the public records must assume the worst-
case scenario, which is that the note has not prescribed.191 Under 
the Louisiana public records doctrine, third parties are entitled to 
rely upon the absence of a timely reinscription of the pledge.192  
                                                                                                             
 184. See New C.C. art. 3168 (2015). 
 185. See New C.C. art. 3169 (2015). But see supra note 173 (concerning the 
effect on third persons of filing of the act of pledge if it is later timely recorded). 
 186. See New C.C. arts. 3357–3358 (2015). 
 187. New C.C. art. 3357 (2015).  
 188. C.C. art. 3498 (2015). But see infra note 194 (discussing installment 
notes). 
 189. See discussion infra Part XI. 
 190. Interruption could occur by payment, by acknowledgment, or by the 
constant acknowledgement rule. See infra Part XI. 
 191. For a series of examples of these rules involving mortgages and a 
further explanation, see RUBIN, A PRÉCIS, supra note 42, at 20.2. 
 192. As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in London Towne Condominium 
Homeowner’s Ass’n v. London Towne Co., 939 So. 2d 1227, 1232–33 (La. 
2006), “the law of registry does not create rights in a positive sense, but rather 
has the negative effect of denying the effectiveness of certain rights unless they 
are recorded. . . . [T]he public records doctrine allows the parties to rely on the 
absence of documents in the public records . . . .” (quoting Phillips v. Parker, 
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Example #9. The facts are the same as in Example #8, 
except that the June 15, 2015, note is due in eleven years, 
not three years, with the last installment due July 15, 2026, 
and the act of pledge recites these provisions of the note. 
As in Example #8, the act of pledge will affect third parties 
from the date it was recorded in the parish mortgage records 
(August 1, 2015)193 but now, under New C.C. art. 3358, the pledge 
will continue to affect third parties until July 15, 2032, “six years 
after the latest maturity date described in the instrument.”194  
Example #10. The facts are the same as in Example #9, 
except that on December 1, 2031, Creditor reinscribes the 
act of pledge in the parish mortgage records.  
Assuming that the act of reinscription contains the information 
required by New C.C. art. 3362,195 the reinscription is timely 
because it is made prior to July 15, 2032,196 and the effects of 
recordation will continue until December 1, 2041, ten years from 
the date of the timely reinscription.197  
D. What Happens When a Landlord Pledges the Same Lease or 
Rents to Multiple Creditors 
The 2014 amendments recognize that a landlord of immovables 
may pledge the same lease or rents to multiple creditors. New C.C. 
art. 3173 deals with the rights of superior and inferior pledgees.  
New C.C. art. 3173 “changes the law by generally permitting 
an inferior pledgee to collect rent from the lessee without a duty to 
                                                                                                             
 
483 So. 2d 972 (La. 1986); Parish Nat’l Bank v. Wilks, 923 So. 2d 8, 15 (La. Ct. 
App. 2005)).  
 193. See supra note 173 (discussing filing and recordation). 
 194. New C.C. art. 3358 (2015). Although prescription might run on each 
installment of a note that is not secured by a pledge, the “constant 
acknowledgment” rule may keep the entire note and its unpaid installments from 
prescribing. Compare the “constant acknowledgement” rule, discussed infra Part 
XI, with cases involving prescription of installments on a note. See, e.g., 
Johnston v. Johnston, 568 So. 2d 567, 568 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Home Fin. Corp. 
v. Fisher, 361 So. 2d 463, 465 (La. Ct. App. 1978).  
 195. Note that under New C.C. art. 3363, the method of reinscription under 
New C.C. art 3362 is the only acceptable method of reinscription. 
 196. New C.C. art. 3358 (2015). 
 197. New C.C. art. 3364 (2015). 
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account to a superior pledgee for the rent collected.”198 Analogous 
rules are found in UCC 9.199  
Two examples may help explain some of these new pledge 
rules.200 
Example #11. The facts are similar to those in Example #8, 
above: June 1, 2015, lease of immovable between Landlord 
and Tenant, and June 15, 2015, loan agreement between 
Landlord and Creditor and act of pledge.  
 
Unlike Example #8, however, the act of pledge between 
Landlord and Creditor was recorded in the appropriate 
parish mortgage records on June 15, 2015. A few weeks 
later, on July 1, 2015, Landlord and Bank, a new lender, 
entered into another act of pledge of the same lease, and 
Bank recorded the act of pledge on that same date in the 
parish mortgage records. Bank is an inferior pledgee 
because the pledge to it was recorded after the recordation 
of the pledge to Creditor. 
 
In this Example #11, Creditor, the superior pledgee, did not 
notify Tenant of its June 15, 2015, act of pledge. On July 2, 
2015, however, the inferior pledgee, Bank, notified Tenant 
of its act of pledge. Pursuant to the notification Tenant 
received, Tenant sent the monthly payments for August, 
September, and October 2015 to Bank as each payment 
became due.  
 
It is not until October 2015 that Creditor became aware of 
Bank’s act of pledge and of Tenant’s payments to Bank. 
Under New C.C. art. 3173, Bank “is not bound to account” to 
Creditor for the rent collected because Creditor had not notified 
Tenant of Creditor’s pledge and directed Tenant to make payment 
to Creditor. Thus, Bank is not liable to Creditor to repay any of the 
amounts Bank collected from Tenant. This is a change in the prior 
law.201  
                                                                                                             
 198. New C.C. art. 3173 cmt. a (2015). 
 199. New C.C. art. 3173 cmt. c (2015). 
 200. These examples do not cover the provisions of New C.C. art. 3173 
dealing with “written directions given to the lessee to pay rent to the holder of 
the superior pledge” or the obligations of an inferior pledgee who collects rent 
after the extinguishment of all secured obligations owed to it. 
 201. New C.C. art. 3173, Comment (b), states in pertinent part:  
(b) Former R.S. 9:4401(G)(2) provided that, if a pledgee had not 
notified the lessee to make direct payment to him, the lessee was 
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Moreover, if Bank had taken the rental payments and put them 
in a deposit account, Creditor’s claims to such amounts would be 
trumped by Bank’s rights, because in this example Bank had no 
duty to account to Creditor for the monthly rent collected as it 
accrued.202  
Example #12. The facts are the same as in Example #11, 
above, except that, on July 2, 2015, when inferior pledgee 
Bank notified Tenant of its act of pledge, Bank convinced 
Tenant to pre-pay the rent for August, September, and 
October 2015. 
Pursuant to New C.C. art. 3173, while Bank may keep the 
August 2015 rent, Bank must account to Creditor (the superior 
pledgee) for rent Bank “collects more than one month before it is 
due.” Thus, Bank would be liable to Creditor for the pre-paid rent 
for September and October.203 
E. What a Pledgee of Rents or Leases May Do 
A pledgee of leases or rents may give written notice to the 
tenant to pay directly to the pledgee.204 There is no statutory 
prohibition preventing the pledgee doing this even before the 
pledgor is in default on the obligation the pledge secures, and New 
C.C. art. 3160 expressly authorizes such actions. Often, creditors 
like to receive and control the rent stream in what is sometimes 
                                                                                                             
 
exonerated of liability for rent paid to the lessor or a subsequent 
assignee; however, the person to whom payment was remitted was 
nevertheless liable to the pledgee for the sums received. Thus, an 
inferior pledgee who collected rent was exposed to liability to a 
superior pledgee for any rent he might collect. This Article now permits 
the inferior pledgee to retain rent he collects as it falls due, unless a 
superior pledgee has notified the lessee to make payment to him and 
the inferior pledgee has knowledge of these instructions. 
 202. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4402(C) (Supp. 2015): 
Notwithstanding Subsection B of this Section, the right of a pledgee to 
collections of rent deposited into a deposit account maintained by him 
or for his benefit is superior to the right of another pledgee to those 
collections, unless the pledgee who collected the rent has an obligation 
to account for the collections to the other pledgee under Civil Code 
Article 3173. 
 203. New C.C. art. 3173 cmt. d (2015) (“Without a rule limiting the ability of 
an inferior pledgee to collect future rents, a superior pledgee might have 
discovered that all future rents for the balance of the term of the lease had been 
paid in advance to an inferior pledgee.”). 
 204. New C.C. arts. 3161, 3169 (2015). 
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referred to as a “lock-box” arrangement,205 although if the “lock-
box” consists of a deposit account with a financial institution, there 
may be others with claims on the account.206 
Merely recording an act of pledge of leases or rents in the 
mortgage records, however, does not obligate the tenant to do 
anything unless and until the tenant receives a written notice from 
the pledgee directing the tenant to render performance to the 
pledgee. 
New C.C. art. 3174 prevents a pledgee from filing suit to sell 
the pledged lease or rents. It prevents a judicial sale of the pledged 
lease or rents. It prohibits a pledgor and pledgee from agreeing to a 
judicial sale.  
The only things the pledgee can do under the 2014 
amendments are to (a) give notice to the tenant to make the rental 
payments to the pledgee and, if tenant fails to do so, seize the rents 
in the hands of the lessee;207 (b) pursue identifiable cash proceeds 
                                                                                                             
 205. For cases involving a creditor’s lockbox concerning rents, see In re 
Castleton Plaza, LP, 707 F.3d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The note carries 
interest of 8.37% and has several features, such as lockboxes for tenants’ rents 
and approval rights for major leases, designed for additional security.”). See also 
Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bond Int’l Ltd., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (N.D. 
Okla. 2006) (“As part of the agreement, Bond agreed that proceeds from the 
identified leases would be deposited in a bank account at American, which the 
parties refer to as the ‘lockbox.’ This ensured that American could access funds 
for repayment of the loan and keep track of the overall condition of Bond BVI, 
Bond US, and Bond UK.”); 301 E. 69th St. Corp. v. Basser, 461 N.Y.S.2d 932, 
932 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (articulating witness testimony that “he works for the 
managing agent; that he maintains lease files; that he does not see rent payments 
because they are mailed to a lock box; that only if there is a problem does the 
rent payment go to his desk”). Cf. Jeffrey A. Usow, The Return of Seller 
Financing for Commercial Real Estate?, 24 PROB. & PROP. 51, 53 (2010) 
(stating that a lender “also may want to insist that all operating revenues be 
placed in a lockbox subject to a deposit control agreement to give it a security 
interest in the rents and profits from the property”); Donald R. Cassling, 
Banking Briefs, 120 BANKING L.J. 537, 554 (2003). 
 206. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4402(B) (Supp. 2015). 
 207. New C.C. art. 3174 cmts. a–b (2015) (citations omitted) provides as 
follows: 
(a) This Article, which is new and has no counterpart in either the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 or former R.S. 9:4401, highlights a 
fundamental distinction between the enforcement of the pledge of a 
movable and the enforcement of the pledge of the lessor’s rights under 
the lease of an immovable. In the case of the pledge of a movable, 
Article 3158 (Rev. 2014) permits an extra-judicial disposition by the 
pledgee, if authorized in the contract of pledge, as well as seizure and 
sale by judicial process of the thing pledged. This Article precludes the 
pledgee of the lessor’s rights in the lease of an immovable and its rents 
from proceeding with either kind of disposition. Allowing the pledgee 
to sell the lessor’s rights under the lease, whether by private or judicial 
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of rent;208 and (c) demand an accounting from an inferior pledgee 
who either has collected pre-paid rent or who has collected rents 
with the knowledge that this payment “violated written directions 
given to the lessee to pay rent to the holder of the superior 
pledge.”209  
F. Right of Pursuit of Identifiable Cash Proceeds of Rent 
The 2014 amendments continue the prior rule permitting a 
pledgee of rent of an immovable to pursue the identifiable cash 
proceeds of the rental payments in the absence of an agreement to 
the contrary between pledgor and pledgee.210 The term “identifiable 
cash proceeds of rent”211 is more limited than the prior provisions of 
old Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4401(F);212 however, the 
phrase does encompass “money, checks, deposit accounts, or the 
like.”213  
If there are multiple pledges of rent, a superior pledgee may 
pursue the identifiable cash proceeds that the inferior pledgee has 
placed into its deposit account if the inferior pledgee has “an 
obligation to account for the collections” under New C.C. art. 
3173.214 
                                                                                                             
 
sale, would, in a sense, effect an undesirable dismemberment of ownership 
of the immovable.  
(b) The pledge of lessor’s rights in the lease of an immovable and its 
rents is enforced only by collection of rents and enforcement of other 
obligations of the lessee under the lease. The pledgee is given the right 
to collect rents by Article 3160 (Rev. 2014) and, to effectuate this right, 
is permitted by Article 3161 (Rev. 2014) to direct the lessee to pay rent 
to him. If necessary, the pledgee may enforce his rights by bringing suit 
directly against the lessee. He may also employ remedies available 
under the Code of Civil Procedure to seize the rents in the hands of the 
lessee, but he cannot cause the lessor’s rights under the lease to be sold 
by judicial process. 
 208. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4402 (2015); see also supra Part IX.F. 
 209. New C.C. art. 3173 (2015). 
 210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4402 (Supp. 2015). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. § 9:4402 cmt. (a) (emphasis supplied). 
Former R.S. 9:4401(F) provided that the assignee’s interest in leases 
and rents continued in any identifiable proceeds, including 
collections. Subsection A of this section limits the reach of the pledge 
of a lessor’s interest in the rents of an immovable to identifiable cash 
proceeds, such as money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like. 
Id. 
 213. Id. § 9:4402(A). 
 214. Id. § 9:4402(C) (quoted in full at supra note 202). See also supra Part 
IX.D (concerning multiple pledges). 
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New Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4402(b) also 
clarifies the respective rights of the pledgee and the depositary 
institution into which the identifiable proceeds are placed.215 
X. CLARIFICATION OF RULES INVOLVING JUDICIAL MORTGAGES  
Act 281 of 2014 adds a Comment to Civil Code article 3359 
without altering the text of this article, which deals with the 
duration of a judicial mortgage.216 Act 281 also amends Civil Code 
article 3368 concerning cancellation of a prescribed judicial 
mortgage.  
A. The Comments Added to C.C. arts. 3359 and 3364 
When C.C. arts. 3359 and 3364 were added in 2005,217 there 
were no corresponding Louisiana State Law Institute Comments; 
however, this was because the 2005 revisions were “part of a larger 
legislative reworking of the law of registry,”218 and the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has looked to the Louisiana State Law Institute 
Comments from 1992, when the registry articles previously had 
been reworked,219 in connection with interpreting the 2005 
revisions.220  
C.C. art. 3359 provides that the “effect of recordation of a 
judgment creating a judicial mortgage ceases ten years after the 
                                                                                                             
 215. Id. § 9:4402 cmt. (B):  
When proceeds of rent are deposited into a deposit account maintained 
with a financial institution, Subsection B provides that the rights of the 
pledgee are subject to the rights of the depository bank, the rights of a 
secured party who holds a security interest perfected by control of the 
deposit account, and the rights of a transferee of funds from the deposit 
account who does not act in collusion with the pledgor in violating the 
rights of the pledgee. Except as otherwise provided in Subsection C, the 
rights of a pledgee to proceeds held in the deposit account are also 
subject to the rights of another pledgee holding a superior pledge of the 
rent. Thus, if a lessor who has granted pledges in favor of two or more 
pledgees deposits rent he has collected into a deposit account, the 
ranking of the rights of the competing pledgees to the deposited rent is 
preserved. 
 216. See Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts. 
 217. See Act No. 169, §1, 2005 La. Acts 1383. 
 218. Wede v. Niche Mktg. USA, LLC, 52 So. 3d 60, 66 (La. 2010). 
 219. See Act No. 1132, §1, 1992 La. Acts 3123. 
 220. Wede, 52 So. 2d at 66: 
Thus, because the legislature left intact Article 3320 and the principles 
espoused in these revision comments when recently revising the law of 
recordation, we are bound to continue to recognize these principles. 
Id. 
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date of the judgment.” Civil Code article 3364 states that “a notice 
of reinscription that is recorded before the effect of recordation 
ceases continues that effect for ten years from the date the notice is 
recorded.”  
Act 281 added Comments to both C.C. arts. 3359 and 3364 but 
did not change the text of the articles. The new Comments221 point 
out that if a judgment is not timely revived,222 the judgment 
prescribes and becomes unenforceable. Thus, judgment creditors 
will want to be sure to file the revival suit timely.223  
Both the 2014 Comment to C.C. art. 3359 and the Comment to 
New C.C. art. 3362224 point out that the only way to reinscribe a 
                                                                                                             
 221. These Comments were, in part, a reworking of the 1992 comments 
contained in Act No. 1132, 1992 La. Acts 3123. The 2014 Comment (b) added 
to Civil Code article 3359 stated the following:  
(b) The failure to reinscribe a judicial mortgage within ten years of its 
date causes the effect of recordation to cease. As the courts have 
observed, there is a common misunderstanding as to the relationship 
between reinscribing a judicial mortgage and obtaining a judgment of 
revival under C.C.P. Art. 3334. Under Article 3300 (Rev. 2014), a 
judicial mortgage is created by the filing of a money judgment in the 
mortgage records. This Article provides that the effect of recordation of 
a judgment creating a judicial mortgage ceases ten years after the date 
of the judgment. A notice of reinscription filed in accordance with 
Article 3362 (Rev. 2014) continues the effect of recordation of a 
judicial mortgage, without the necessity of filing a judgment reviving 
the original judgment. The judgment itself prescribes, however, if a suit 
to revive it is not filed within ten years of its date and a judgment 
reviving it obtained in due course. If the judicial mortgage is not 
reinscribed, the effect of recordation ceases whether or not prescription 
on the underlying judgment is interrupted by a suit for revival. If the 
judicial mortgage is reinscribed, it nevertheless becomes unenforceable 
when the underlying judgment prescribes. Accordingly, Article 3368 
(Rev. 2014) permits the recorder to cancel the inscription from his 
records upon the request of any person if the request is accompanied by 
a certificate from the clerk of the court rendering the judgment that no 
suit has been filed for its revival within the time required by Article 
3501 (Rev. 1983) or is accompanied by a final and definitive judgment 
of that court rejecting the demands of the plaintiff in a suit to revive it. 
The 2014 Comment to Civil Code article 3364 states:  
Under this Article, reinscription is effective when a notice of reinscription 
is filed. The effect of the original recordation is extended ten years from 
that time. 
 222. A money judgment prescribes “ten years from the time the judgment 
becomes final.” C.C. art. 3501 (2015). 
 223. A “filing of the motion to revive interrupts the prescriptive period 
applicable to the judgment.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2031(a) (2015).  
 224. The comment to New C.C. art. 3362 states:  
The method of reinscription provided for in this Article, which has 
been the exclusive means of reinscription since January 1, 1993, is 
much simpler than the method that was previously required. 
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judgment and continue its effect for an additional ten years is via 
an act of reinscription filed in the mortgage records. Filing the 
revival judgment in the mortgage records may not suffice to allow 
the judicial mortgage to continue to affect third parties and to 
maintain its original ranking date from the time it was first 
inscribed in the parish mortgage records.  
B. The Change in New C.C. art. 3368 Concerning Cancellation of 
Judicial Mortgages 
The 2014 amendments to New C.C. art. 3368 are designed to 
allow for the cancellation of the inscription of a judicial mortgage. 
A judicial mortgage may be cancelled if a revival suit has not been 
timely instituted, even if a timely act of reinscription has been 
filed. As the Comment to New C.C. art. 3368 notes, “reinscription 
of a judicial mortgage and revival of the underlying judgment are 
entirely different concepts.”225 The suit for revival must be filed 
within ten years from the date “the judgment becomes final.”226  
Even though, under New C.C. art. 3368,227 a reinscribed 
judicial mortgage cannot be cancelled without a “certificate from 
                                                                                                             
 
New C.C. art. 3362 cmt. (2015). 
 225. The entire comment to the New C.C. art. 3368 states:  
As Comment (b) to Article 3359 (Rev. 2014) explains, reinscription of 
a judicial mortgage and revival of the underlying judgment are entirely 
different concepts. Both timely reinscription and a timely suit for 
revival are necessary for a judicial mortgage to continue to have effect. 
Under this Article, even if a judicial mortgage is reinscribed, the 
recorder must cancel the inscription of the judicial mortgage from his 
records upon any person’s request accompanied by a certificate from 
the clerk of the court rendering the underlying judgment that no suit 
was filed for its revival within the time required by Article 3501 (Rev. 
1983) or by a final and definitive judgment of that court rejecting the 
demands of the plaintiff in a suit to revive it. 
New C.C. art. 3368 cmt. (2015). 
 226. C.C. art. 3501 (2015). 
 227. The amendments to Civil Code article 3368 are as follows, with deleted 
text shown with bracketed strike-throughs:  
Notwithstanding the reinscription of a judicial mortgage created by the 
filing of a judgment of a court of this state, [The] the recorder shall 
cancel the judicial mortgage [a judicial mortgage created by the filing 
of a judgment of a court of this state that has been reinscribed] from his 
records upon [the written request] any person's written request to which 
is attached a certificate from the clerk of the court rendering the 
judgment that no suit or motion [has been] was filed for its revival 
within the time required by Article 3501 or of a certified copy of a final 
and definitive judgment of the court rejecting the demands of the 
plaintiff in a suit or motion to revive the judgment.  
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the clerk of the court rendering the judgment” concerning the lack 
of a timely revival suit, cautious creditors also may consider filing 
a notice of lis pendens in every parish where the judicial mortgage 
had been recorded to show that the revival suit was timely228  
Prior to 2005, a Louisiana statute provided that if the revival 
suit was timely and if the judgment creditor filed a notice of lis 
pendens, the judgment creditor then had up to three years to get the 
new revival judgment.229 That statute was repealed in 2005.230 
Thus it appears that as long as the revival suit is filed timely,231 
there apparently is no statutory limit (other than the abandonment 
rules)232 on obtaining the revival judgment. 
XI. THE CONSTANT ACKNOWLEDGMENT RULE 
The 2014 amendments make no mention of the constant 
acknowledgment rule—the Louisiana doctrine holding that a 
pledge constantly interrupts prescription on the principal obligation 
it secures, which results in the principal obligation never prescribing 
as long as the pledge exists.233 The constant acknowledgement rule 
                                                                                                             
 
Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts. 
 228. Usually, revival judgments occur quickly because they are brought ex 
parte and “[n]o citation or service of process of the motion to revive shall be 
required.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2031 (2015).  
 229. The prior, now-repealed process under former Revised Statutes section 
9:5502 was described in an earlier article. See Michael H. Rubin & R. Marshall 
Grodner, Recent Developments in Security Devices, 53 LA. L. REV. 969, 1008 
(1993) (“A judgment prescribes ten years from its date. An action to revive the 
judgment must be begun prior to the expiration of the ten years. If the action to 
revive the judgment is brought timely, and if a notice of lis pendens is timely 
filed, then the judgment creditor has three years in which to obtain a new 
judgment reviving the older one; upon the timely recordation of the new 
judgment within the ten year period, the original judgment is reinscribed for an 
additional ten years from the date of the timely lis pendens notice.”).  
 230. See Act No. 169, §8, 2005 La. Acts 1383 (repealing former Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:5502). 
 231. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2031 (2015) (noting that a timely suit 
interrupts prescription on the original judgment).  
 232. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 561 (2015). For a case applying the 
abandonment rules to a suit to revive a judgment, see Evans v. Hamner, 24 So. 
2d 814 (La. 1946). See also Goldsby v. Dr. R.E. Goldsby, Ltd., 2010-1218, 2011 
WL 3806281, at *3 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2011) (citing Evans stating, “[b]ecause 
the lawsuit to revive the money judgment was abandoned, the interruption of La. 
C.C. art. 3501’s ten-year prescriptive period by the timely filing of the lawsuit to 
revive the judgment is considered to never have occurred.”).  
 233. See generally Succession of Picard, 115 So. 2d 817 (La. 1959); Scott v. 
Corkern, 91 So. 2d 569 (La. 1956). For more discussion on the constant 
acknowledgement rule, see RUBIN, A PRÉCIS, supra note 42, at 13.5–13.6. 
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has been applied in the context of collateral mortgages both before 
and after the 1990 adoption of UCC 9,234 and because the 2014 
amendments are silent on this, it must be assumed that the 2014 
amendments make no change in the law concerning constant 
acknowledgment for any item that can be pledged via delivery. 
CONCLUSION 
The extensive changes, clarifications, and alterations made by 
the 2014 amendments reflect the efforts of the Louisiana State Law 
Institute both to bring the law of pledge into the 21st Century and 
to take into account analogous rules under UCC 9. Counsel for 
creditors, debtors, landlords, tenants, and other obligors whose 
rights are subject to pledge under the 2014 amendments will 
benefit from the clarity of these new rules and from the 
information provided in the Law Institute’s Comments. 
  
                                                                                                             
 234. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Univ. Lake Corp., 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1980); Gulf 
Nat’l, L.L.C. v. Alfortish, Inc., 926 So. 2d 676 (La. Ct. App. 2006). But see 
CadleRock Joint Ventures Co. v. J. Graves Scaffolding Co., Inc., 152 So. 3d 
1079 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (relying on pre-1990 old pledge articles rather than 
UCC 9 in referring to how real security in a post-1990 collateral mortgage note 
is obtained). See supra note 39.  
  
 
 
